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TWO WRONGS DON’T MAKE A FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT: SAMSON 1 COURT ERRS IN CHOOSING PROPER
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, ERRS IN RESULT,
PAROLEES LOSE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Arkansas, police may search a parolee’s computer without cause
for evidence of legal, but pornographic, material. 2 Scholars cry out,
“The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment,” 3 as the Supreme
Court continues to chill Fourth Amendment rights unreasonably by
subjecting classes of the population to search at any time without cause. 4
1. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
2. Charlie Frago, Computers Parole Tools in Sex Cases, Officers Told, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, Nov. 7, 2006. Arkansas argues that parolee searches such as these are justified, in
particular for sex offenders, as “the images, words and video inside a sex offenders’ [sic] computer
can be a blueprint of hidden desires.” Id. Officials claim that finding pornographic material before
a crime is committed can help to avert risk of future offenses. Id. Policies of random computer
searches are based on research indicating that viewing pornographic materials will increase the
likelihood of sex offenders reoffending, a proposition that is fiercely debated. Id. While random
searches of parolees are justified using the Samson decision, courts rely further on the consent
rationale as many sex offenders in Arkansas have a parole condition that restricts them from
viewing pornography – locating pornography on their computer can be enough to send them back to
prison. Id. Some wish to push the limits of Samson. Id. One official remarked, “[f]or the
computer searches to be effective, states need to attach limits on Internet use as part of a parolee’s
supervisory plan,” and further recommending that “Internet chat rooms, Webbased e-mail accounts
that can be accessed from any computer, detachable disk drives and USB devices should all be off
limits to sex offenders.” Id.
3. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1994).
Amar further exemplifies many people’s frustrations with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, remarking:
Warrants are not required – unless they are. All searches and seizures must be grounded
in probable cause – but not on Tuesdays. . . . Meanwhile, sensible rules that the
Amendment clearly does lay down or presuppose – that all searches and seizures must be
reasonable, that warrants (and only warrants) always require probable cause, and that the
officialdom should be held liable for unreasonable searches and seizures – are ignored by
the Justices. Sometimes . . . [i]f there are good reasons for these and countless other odd
results, the Court has not provided them.
Id. at 757-58.
4. See Posting of Dan Filler to Concurring Opinions Blog, Parole After Samson,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/06/parole_after_sa.html (June 20, 2006) (“DA’s
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Samson v. California stands in contrast to many years of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence – from the Framers’ adoption of the Fourth
Amendment as a safeguard against the arbitrary and intrusive searches
supported by general warrants to modern case law explaining that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. 5 Samson serves as the
most recent example of the Supreme Court’s erosion of citizens’ Fourth
Amendment protections. 6
The Samson Court reached an inappropriate decision by ignoring
the importance of Fourth Amendment rights – even for parolees – and
overestimating the state’s interests. 7 Both the consent doctrine and the
special needs doctrine fail to provide adequate justification for
will rarely lose a Fourth Amendment suppression motion submitted by a parolee. Other than states
with a special interest in parolee privacy - and I have yet to meet that state - I would expect most
jurisdictions to encourage officers to conduct these suspicionless searches.”). People feel
differently about preserving Fourth Amendment rights for parolees than they do for innocents,
feeling that Fourth Amendment rights are not completely independent of what a person does with
them. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1459 (1996). People begin with a right to privacy; some lose part of this
right by virtue of their actions. Id. This theory captures the popular sentiment that guilty persons
do not deserve a right to conceal evidence of their criminality. Id. The notion is that “the fourth
amendment exists to protect the innocent and may normally be invoked by the guilty only when
necessary to protect the innocent” so that “if a device could be invented that accurately detected
weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of people, there could be no fourth amendment
objection to its use.” Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246, 1248 (1983).
5. See infra Part.II.A-B and note 15 (discussing general warrants). Modern interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment is not without its contradictions. “Put simply, the single sentence that
constitutes the Fourth Amendment . . . has resulted in billions of words of interpretive text by the
Supreme Court, state and lower federal courts, and commentators.” JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 76 (Lexis 3d ed. 2002). Indeed, current interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment is a “mass of contradictions and obscurities.” Craig M. Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985). Others argue, “although
the Supreme Court purports to rely on a consistent method of constitutional analysis when rendering
decisions on Fourth Amendment issues, the case law in this area indicates that the Court is
influenced sometimes by the citizen’s perspective, sometimes by the police officer’s perspective,
and sometimes by the perspective of the hypothesized reasonable person.” Ronald J. Bacigal,
Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. AND MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 677, 677 (1998).
Through the years, the Court has increasingly moved toward viewing cases “solely from the police
officers’ perception of the reasonableness of their actions and thus . . . has weakened the protections
of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. The Supreme Court’s current decisions hang on one
proposition, that government officers “have free rein to search whomever they choose, whenever
they choose, for whatever reason they choose.” American Civil Liberties Union Urges Supreme
Court to Reaffirm Legal Limits of Police Search, Seizure Powers, U.S. FED. NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006
[hereinafter A.C.L.U.].
6. David T. Reindl, Bargains or Unconstitutional Contracts? How Enforcement of
Probation Orders as Contracts Could Take the Reasonableness Out of Probation Searches, 33 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 123, 135 (2007).
7. See infra Part IV.A. “The bottom line is that government cannot cut constitutional
corners even in pursuit of a goal it identifies as being for the public good.” A.C.L.U., supra note 5.
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suspicionless searches of parolees. 8 This shift in Fourth Amendment
interpretation produces unreasonable and unwarranted results. 9
This Note will follow the Fourth Amendment from its origins to its
modern application to parolee rights, as evidenced by the Samson Court.
Part II focuses on the Fourth Amendment, from the circumstances
surrounding its adoption to modern court cases that have applied its
tenets to prisoners, probationers, and, finally, parolees. 10 Part III details
the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. California, including a
thorough discussion of the facts that gave rise to the case and lower
court decisions. 11 Part IV explores the problems with the Court’s
framework and suggests other possible frameworks the Court could have
used to come to a decision in Samson, while also exploring the
ramifications of each analytical framework. 12
II. BACKGROUND
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 13

A. History of the Fourth Amendment
The historical context surrounding the Framers’ inclusion of the
Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights is imperative to a proper
interpretation and application of the Amendment. 14 Prior to the
8. See infra Part IV.B-C.
9. See Filler, supra note 4 (explaining that “the dissent correctly views the decision as a
doctrinal shift, but it is only one more step in a longstanding move towards a ‘common sense’ (i.e.,
defendant unfriendly) approach to criminal justice”).
10. See infra Part II and accompanying notes (discussing the background of the Fourth
Amendment, as well as documenting the slow termination of parolees’ rights).
11. See infra Part III and accompanying notes (setting forth a summary of the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Samson court).
12. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (analyzing the method the Court used to arrive
at their decision as well as other methods they could have employed).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was applied to the states through the
Due Process Clause in Mapp v. Ohio as the “security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police – which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment – is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in the ‘concept of ordered liberty.’” Reindl, supra note 6, at 126-27; see also Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. See generally Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967) (looking
to the “purposes behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment”). The
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American Revolution, the colonies issued general warrants and “writs of
assistance,” 15 which effectively placed “the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer.” 16 Though British control had ended, the
Framers had the struggle for liberty and history of abuse “fresh in the[ir]
memories” when they adopted the Fourth Amendment and intended to
prevent these types of abuses from reoccurring. 17
Court found further, a “governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, [that] has
consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant.” Id. at 528-29; see also infra note 15. Historical scholars have published numerous
commentaries on the Fourth Amendment that have “either favored or rejected a warrant
requirement. However, none have supported their answer with persuasive historical evidence.”
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH L. REV. 547, 551(1999).
The Fourth Amendment was drafted amidst concerns “almost exclusively about the need to ban
house searches under general warrants.” Id. The idea of a warrantless search was foreign to the
Framers; indeed, they “expected that warrants would be used.” Id. at 552. “[H]eightened concerns
about crime and disorder” created a movement toward giving police officers more power in the
nineteenth century. Id. By the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court had caught up with this
movement and responded to the new threats to individuals’ privacy rights by extending the Fourth
Amendment to cover searches without warrants. Id.
15. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). A writ of assistance, “[i]n colonial
America,” was defined as “a writ issued by a superior colonial court authorizing an officer of the
Crown to enter and search any premises suspected of containing contraband.” BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). “The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of
assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places
for smuggled goods.” Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. “As every American statesman, during our
revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of
English freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may
be confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution.” Id. at 626-27.
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Id. at 635.
16. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; see supra note 15. Attorney James Otis described writs of
assistance as the “worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book,” in a February 1761
debate in Boston to rally support for colonial resistance to Britain. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; United
States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 262 (D. Mass. 2007). John Adams, speaking on James
Otis’s remarks, declared, “[T]hen and there was the first scene of the first act of oppression to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.” Boyd, 116
U.S. at 625; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“It is familiar history that
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”).
17. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; see supra note 15.
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B. Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted the Fourth
Amendment “right against unreasonable searches” as requiring probable
cause for searches and seizures. 18 Searches conducted outside the
18. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a search was not reasonable
because officers did not have their actions scrutinized by a neutral magistrate for probable cause,
thereby implicitly defining the reasonableness prong of the Fourth Amendment in terms of the
warrant clause). The Fourth Amendment has two clauses:
The first portion of the Fourth Amendment tells us what the amendment seeks to prohibit
(or, if you will, what right we hold against the government). In this portion, the text
states who is covered (“the people”); what is covered (“persons, houses, papers, and
effects”); and the nature of the protection (“to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures”). This portion of the Fourth Amendment, in particular the latter
language, is sometimes described as the “Reasonableness Clause” (or “reasonableness
requirement”) of the Fourth Amendment. The second portion of the Fourth Amendment
relates to warrants. It tells us what is required for a warrant to be issued (“probable
cause [for the search or seizure], supported by oath or affirmation”), and tells us
something about the form of the warrant itself (“particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized”). This portion of the text is often
described as the “Warrant Clause”, with its “particularity requirement.”
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 77 (alteration in original). One of the longest debates in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence surrounds the issue of what connection there should be between the
reasonableness requirement and the Warrant Clause. Id. “For most of the Fourth Amendment’s
history, the Supreme Court read the two phrases together, interpreting the vague term
‘unreasonable’ as modified by the requirements of the ‘warrant clause.’” Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d
at 265. Under this “unitary” approach, a reasonable search or seizure would necessarily be
supported by probable cause and be executed pursuant to a valid warrant. Id. at 266. See generally
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533 (questioning “whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,” making necessary the implication that search
requirements are typically construed in light of the warrant requirement). Critics of the unitary
approach maintain that as the probable cause requirement is found only in the Warrant Clause,
probable cause is only necessary in cases in which an officer has applied for a warrant. See William
S. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 899-89 (1991). As to
warrantless searches and seizures, the text of the Fourth Amendment tells us only that the activity be
reasonable. Amar, supra note 3, at 785. Some scholars claim that the warrant requirement is
unnecessary because of the impracticability of the warrant requirement actually protecting citizens’
rights. Indeed,
[h]ow can a magistrate be more than a ‘rubber stamp’ in signing warrants unless he
devotes at least some minutes in each case to reading the affidavits submitted to him in
support of the request for a warrant, and inquiring into the background of the conclusions
stated therein? And where is the judicial time going to be found to make such inquiries
in the generality of cases?
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE AMERICAN
ASSEMBLY: THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85, 117 (Harry W. Jones ed.
1965). Others still find reason to impose a warrant requirement in that it requires police officers to
show that they had probable cause prior to arrests and searches, to serve as a check on officers,
ensuring that they do not make up probable cause after the fact. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL 214-15 (1966). But, the warrant requirement does not prevent illegal searches.
Stuntz, supra, at 893.
Police officers are not the only ones who can get the relevant legal standards wrong;
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prescribed limits of the Fourth Amendment are per se unreasonable,
“subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions.” 19 All searches and seizures are measured against the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme
Court has continually explained and clarified what is and is not
reasonable. 20
1. The Reasonableness Requirement
In recent years, the Supreme Court has generally applied a more

other actors in the system make mistakes as well. And while requiring warrants does
reduce the odds of police mistake in applying the relevant legal standards, it also creates
additional opportunities for error by magistrates. This is no small problem. Magistrates
(1) may do a bad job of applying the probable cause standard because of deficiencies in
the warrant process (review is ex parte and cursory), and (2) nevertheless receive a great
deal of deference by judges after the fact. Requiring warrants therefore may lead to
many more bad searches than would a simple system of police decisionmaking followed
by after-the-fact review.
Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
19. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Exceptions to the warrant requirement should be “jealously and
carefully drawn.” Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958). See also State v. Moore, 853
A.2d 903, 906 (N.J. 2004) (listing multiple exceptions to the warrant requirement). The purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, to shield citizens from unwarranted privacy intrusions, would be empty and
without effect if exceptions were given freely. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; but see Robbins v. California,
453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding that the warrant preference model is a
judicial creation that is not implicit in the nature of the Fourth Amendment, as there is nothing in the
Fourth Amendment that requires warrants to be obtained prior to searches). Modern cases still
support the proposition that the judiciary has a preference for the warrant model. See State v.
O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 272 (N.J. 2007).
20. See infra Part II.B.1-2. The Court has done so by setting forth factors that should weigh
heavily in favor of allowing warrantless searches or by naming general categories of exceptions to
the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001)
(finding that the common law practice of requiring warrants to arrest for misdemeanor traffic
violations was “obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive,” as to the Framers’ definition of
reasonableness); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 798 (1984) (“[W]here officers, having
probable cause, enter premises, and with probable cause, arrest the occupants who have legitimate
possessory interests in its contents and take them into custody and, for no more than the period here
involved, [19 hours], secure the premises from within to preserve the status quo while others, in
good faith, are in the process of obtaining a warrant, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
proscription against unreasonable seizures.”); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-84 (1990)
(noting “there are various elements, of course, that can make a search of a person’s house
‘reasonable’ – one of which is the consent of the person or his cotenant”). What the courts
determine as reasonable today differs significantly from historical trends. Reindl, supra note 6, at
129. Around twenty years ago, scholars and courts supported a probable cause standard for
searches of parolees. Id. “Today, of course, such an argument would hardly be persuasive, given
the substantial quantity of recent, unsupportive case law.” Id.
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flexible approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 21 The Court
emphasizes, “The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth
Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the
Courts judge
exercise of discretion by government officials.” 22
reasonableness by assessing the totality of the circumstances and
employing a balancing test that weighs governmental interests against an
individual’s privacy interest. 23 In most criminal cases, this balance is
struck in favor of the warrant procedures outlined in the Fourth
Amendment. 24
2. The Consent Exception
Warrantless searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment if they
are conducted pursuant to consent of the person being searched, so long
as the consent is freely and voluntarily given. 25 Generally, the courts
21. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 266 (remarking that in recent years the Supreme Court “has
abandoned [the unitary] approach and bifurcated the Fourth Amendment, focusing on the
reasonableness clause exclusively, relatively unaffected by the requirements of the warrant clause”).
22. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (holding that stopping and detaining an
automobile without some suspicion is unreasonable according to the Fourth Amendment).
Reasonableness is the cornerstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Reindl, supra note 6, at
169. Whether reasonableness is assured by means of requiring reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, prohibiting arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches, or looking to the intent of law
enforcement officials, “reasonableness is clearly an indispensable constitutional guarantee that
should be implied in every probation agreement.” Id.
23. Id. at 654; see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). Reasonableness
depends on the nature of the search, including all of the circumstances surrounding the search.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
24. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (declaring that a search conducted
without a warrant is per se unreasonable); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948) (remarking the “point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences. . . . Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate . . .”). “[T]he essential purpose of the Fourth
Amendment [is] to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.” Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 588 n.26 (1980). The Fourth Amendment further serves as a check on the
powers of the executive. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 371 (1973-1974). Courts, in enforcing the Fourth Amendment, “police the
police.” Id.
25. Michael Keasler, Criminal Procedure: Confessions, Searches, and Seizures, 59 SMU L.
REV. 1167, 1176 (2006). Consent of the person being searched does not refer only to the searching
of one’s person, but extends to one giving consent for officers to search his home, car, or other
personal effects. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 135 (2006). Further, the person giving
consent need only have actual or apparent authority over the item being searched. See e.g. Georgia
v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110 (2006) (explaining that “the common authority that counts under
the Fourth Amendment may be broader than the rights accorded by property law”).
The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in
[consent] cases is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations,
which are [naturally enough] influenced by property law but not controlled by its
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will presume one does not waive Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unreasonable searches; however, when officers show that waiver is
voluntary, it can be effective. 26
Consent, or waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights, is a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account whether the consenter is the individual whose
property is being searched, a third party with common authority over the

rules . . . . [A] solitary co-inhabitant may sometimes consent to a search of shared
premises . . . [and] the reasonableness of such a search is in significant part a function of
commonly held understandings about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in
ways that affect each other's interests.
Id. See also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (noting that even when consent is given,
police officers should assess the surrounding circumstances to be sure that a reasonable person
would not doubt the truth of the assertion of authority to consent). “Consent to a search is voluntary
when it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.”
Searches and Seizures, supra, § 135. Further, the burden of justifying an otherwise unlawful search
using consent is placed upon the prosecution to prove “the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
Factors that aid in determining whether consent to search was freely given are the age,
education, and intelligence and mental health and capability of the person giving
consent, whether the person giving consent did so immediately, or only after repeated
requests by the police, whether physical coercion was used to obtain consent, whether
the person giving consent was in custody, and whether the officer advised the person
asked to give consent of the right to refuse.
Searches and Seizures, supra, § 135 (citing United States v. Grap, 403 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2005)).
There are several factors that may lead to a presumption that the consent given was obtained
through coercion. L. A. Bradshaw, Annotation, Validity of Consent to Search Given by One in
Custody of Officers, 9 A.L.R.3D 858 (1966). “[A]dditional coercive features, such as putting
handcuffs on the arrestee or incarcerating him, deceitful conduct on the part of the officers, or their
failure to inform the consenter of his constitutional rights, denial of guilt, or evasive conduct,” all
create an inference of coercion. Id.
26. Bradshaw, supra note 25.
[O]ne may waive any constitutional right or privilege, provided that it inheres in the
individual and is intended for his sole benefit, and provided further that the waiver is
voluntary. However, the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights. More specifically, the constitutional right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived.
Id. See also Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (holding that the defendant agreed to
the search at issue and made a voluntary waiver of his privacy rights). “[T]he law of searches and
seizures as revealed in the decisions of [the Supreme] Court is the product of the interplay of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But those rights may be waived.” Id. The Supreme Court does not
justify consent searches based on waiver, as it would be detrimental to decisions in other areas of
law. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 277. For example, waiver is defined as the relinquishment of a
known right or privilege, but the Supreme Court has held that a consent search may be upheld even
if the consenting party was not aware that he could refuse. Id. The Court has held that it is not
necessary for police officers to inform of the right to refuse consent when seeking consent. Id. The
Supreme Court has employed various other means to validate consent searches including the theory
that a consent search is not really a search, as a consenting party retains no reasonable expectation
of privacy. Id. Currently, the Supreme Court’s chosen method of validation for consent searches is
that they are reasonable searches by virtue of the consent that is given. Id.
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property being searched, or neither. 27 The consent exception provides a
valuable tool for law enforcement officials to uncover evidence of
crimes they could not otherwise acquire. 28
3. The Special Needs Exception
The Court has also made exceptions to the warrant requirement
when special needs of the state, beyond the need for normal law
enforcement, make a search reasonable. 29 A showing of special needs
27. Bradshaw, supra note 25; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233 (“It is this careful sifting of the
unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our prior decisions involving
consent searches.”).
It cannot be emphasized too much that the determination of the sufficiency of a consent
to a search as affected by the status of the consenter as in custody, depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case, and that there are no hard rules by which
the presence of a certain fact . . . will bind the court to a particular decision. Although
some facts are intrinsically of more weight than others and will of themselves impose a
heavier burden of proof on the government, still the determination ultimately rests on the
interplay of the various facts discussed in the annotation, and their probable effect on the
individual defendant in the light of his own actions and characteristics and all of the
surrounding circumstances.
Bradshaw, supra note 25.
28. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227-28 (highlighting situations where consent provides evidence
of criminal activity and where a consent search proves a further investigation unnecessary).
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable
cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means
of obtaining important and reliable evidence. . . . And in those cases where there is
probable cause to arrest or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search
may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves fruitless, that in itself may
convince the police that an arrest with its possible stigma and embarrassment is
unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In
short, a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the
subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and
wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.
Id. But see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 276-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s
decision that individuals can waive constitutional rights that they were not even aware they
possessed). The use of the consent exception as explained in Schneckloth capitalizes on the fact that
citizens are not aware of their rights. Id. Courts have routinely held that police officers are under
no obligation to inform citizens of their right to refuse consent for a search. Id.
29. WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §§ 10:1,
10.3 (2006). The term “special needs” was first used by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion
to the 1985 case, New Jersey v. T.L.O., a high school search case where “special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, [made] the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.” 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). In T.L.O., the Court held,
“The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher
to obtain a warrant . . . would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” Id. at 340. Special needs initially developed from
administrative searches, which had to be accompanied by regulations that limited discretion and
further required that the primary purpose of the search be separate from crime control. Stewart, 468
F. Supp. 2d at 266-67. While the doctrine of special needs is generally accepted, there exist notable
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tips the scale sharply in the state’s favor when performing the balancing
test; the defendant’s burden of showing that his liberty and privacy
interests outweigh the state’s interests is nearly impossible to meet. 30
The special needs exception requires that the search “must serve a
primary purpose separate from the general interest in crime control,” and
that the purpose must be “narrowly tailored to the means used to
effectuate that purpose.” 31

opinions suggesting its illegality. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635
(1989) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (suggesting that by creating exceptions for special needs, the Court
is joining the ranks of those who “have allowed basic constitutional rights to fall prey to momentary
emergencies”). Courts have identified many examples of situations that constitute a special need.
See e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627 (holding that safety sensitive tasks, such as conducting a train,
constitute a situation in which there is a special need for warrantless searches). Railroad employees
have a diminished expectation of privacy due to their participation in an industry that is highly
regulated to ensure safety, safety that is dependent upon on the conditions of employees. Id.;
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (holding that seeking evidence to solve a specific
crime is a special need); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (holding that a police checkpoint
for the purpose of seeking information about a hit-and-run homicide was not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. Further, “brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for purposes of
combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants” are not outlawed by the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (“Stops for brief
questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant.”). The Court has also found several notable
situations that do not constitute a special need. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Van
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 684 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent) (finding the government’s purpose in
conducting random urine testing of Customs Service employees to protect the integrity of the
agency to be too generalized and speculative to be reasonable); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a hospital policy requiring pregnant women to submit to drug testing
was not valid because its primary purpose was law enforcement).
30. RINGEL, supra note 29. See, e.g., People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d. 1251 (Cal. 1986)
(holding institutional security to be a special need). The Burgener Court further explained,
A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible
with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure
institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that
the prisoner’s expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the
paramount interest in institutional security.
Id. at 1267.
The balance thus falls heavily on the side of the governmental interest in public safety,
and leads to a conclusion that the appropriate standard of reasonableness to justify a
parole search is a reasonable suspicion on the part of the parole officer that the parolee is
again involved in criminal activity, or has otherwise violated his parole, and the search
may turn up evidence of that activity, or that evidence of a proposed future violation by
the parolee will be uncovered. That suspicion must of course be based on articulable
facts which together with rational inferences from those facts warrant objectively
reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 1271.
31. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 267-68 (D. Mass. 2007). It is dispositive
that the search must serve a purpose apart from a general interest in crime control. Reindl, supra
note 6, at 130. “If the only concern in the context of probation was to enforce laws, departure from
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C. Carving Away at the Fourth Amendment
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court handed down a
series of cases that helped escalate the Fourth Amendment’s move from
domination by the traditional unitary approach to a test of
reasonableness. 32 Together, these cases created confusion as to the
proper method of evaluating a Fourth Amendment case. 33
1. Hudson v. Palmer 34 takes Fourth Amendment Rights from
Prisoners
In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in Hudson v. Palmer that
prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy and are subject to
suspicionless searches at any time. 35 The Court determined that the
institution of prison “carries with it the circumscription or loss of many
significant rights” necessary to accommodate the needs of the prison
environment. 36 The state has an immense need to maintain prison
conditions, and the environment of the prison itself makes it
impracticable to require warrants before conducting searches. 37 The
the probable cause requirement would likely never have been declared constitutionally permissible.”
Id.
32. See supra Part II.B and note 18.
33. See infra Part II.C.2. Cases have created a split between jurisdictions as to whether the
balancing test or the special needs test is the appropriate test to use for determining Fourth
Amendment rights. State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 273 (N.J. 2007).
34. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). On September 16, 1981, Hudson, an officer at a correctional center,
along with another officer, conducted a shakedown of Palmer’s prison locker and cell. Id. at 519.
The officers discovered a torn pillowcase in Palmer’s trash can and subsequently filed charges
against Palmer for destroying state property. Id. at 519-20. Palmer was found guilty in a
disciplinary hearing and ordered to pay for the destroyed material. Id. at 520. Palmer then filed a §
1983 action alleging that Hudson had conducted the search of his cell and brought false charges
against him for the purpose of harassment. Id. Further, Palmer alleged that Hudson had
intentionally destroyed some of his possessions during the search, constituting a violation of
Palmer’s Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process of law.
Id. The District Court granted Hudson summary judgment. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed the
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case, holding that summary judgment on the claim
that the search was unreasonable was not warranted given the facts of the situation. Id. at 520-21.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether prisoners have a right to privacy in
their cells entitling them to Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 522.
35. Id. at 526. Prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize as legitimate. Id.
36. Id. at 524. The needs in a prison environment include maintaining internal security and
keeping conditions sanitary. Id. at 524-27. Security is necessary to protect the safety of inmates,
officers, and visitors. Id. at 526-27.
37. It is not accurate to say that a prisoner lacks privacy rights. See Thompson v. Souza, 111
F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment right . . . to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extends to incarcerated prisoners.’”) (quoting Michenfelder v.
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Court’s holding in Hudson was narrowly tailored to address issues
surrounding Fourth Amendment rights of prisoners and left issues
surrounding others involved in the criminal justice system
unaddressed. 38
2. Two Approaches to Probation Searches – Griffin v.
Wisconsin 39 and United States v. Knights 40
In 1987, the Supreme Court again looked to the privacy rights of
those in the criminal justice system, this time holding in Griffin v.
Wisconsin that warrantless searches of probationers are consistent with
the Fourth Amendment. 41 The Court justified the search by explaining
Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988)). Instead, prisoners are denied many aspects of Fourth
Amendment protection because it “is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of
‘institutional needs and objectives’ of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security.”
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524 (citations omitted).
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have
demonstrated proclivity for anti-social criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates
have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the
legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown
an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a respect for law or an
appreciation of the rights of others.
Id. at 526. “The administration of a prison, we have said, is ‘at best an extraordinarily difficult
undertaking.’ But it would be literally impossible to accomplish the prison objectives identified
above if inmates retained a right to privacy in their cells.” Id. at 527 (citations omitted).
38. See id. at 526-27.
39. 483 U.S. 868 (1987). Joseph Griffin was sentenced to probation for felony charges of
resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an officer. Id. at 870. As a condition of his
probation, Griffin was subject to a search condition that required him to consent to searches at any
time if the probation supervisor agreed to the search and there were reasonable grounds to believe
that contraband was present. Id. at 870-71. After receiving information that Griffin was in
possession of guns, probation officers conducted a search of his residence without obtaining a
warrant. Id. at 871. A gun was found at Griffin’s residence, and Griffin was indicted on a state law
charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. Griffin’s motion to suppress the gun was
denied, and he was convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Id. The Wisconsin Court
of Appeals and Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Id. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the search of Griffin’s residence violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 870.
40. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Mark James Knights was sentenced to California state probation for
a drug offense. Id. at 114. As a condition of probation, he agreed to submit his person, residence,
and effects to search at any time without cause to a probation or law enforcement officer. Id. After
police developed reasonable suspicion that Knights had been involved in acts of vandalism and
arson, a police detective conducted a search of Knights’s apartment. Id. at 114-15. Knights was
arrested and indicted. Id. at 116. At trial, the District Court granted Knights’s motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from his apartment on the grounds that the search condition was limited to
probation searches and did not include investigative searches. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the search in question violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
41. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870. While the Court did hold warrantless searches of probationers
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that the special needs exception “satisfies the demands of the Fourth
Amendment because [the search] was carried out pursuant to a
regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement under well-established principles.” 42
In 2001, the Supreme Court reached the same holding in United
States v. Knights in a strikingly different way, this time explicitly
holding that no more than reasonable suspicion is required to search a
probationer. 43 The Court found that the state has considerable interests
in supervising probationers due to the dual goals of probation –
rehabilitating offenders and protecting society. 44 Probationers are more
likely than law-abiding citizens to commit crimes and have a larger
incentive to hide their criminal activities. 45 The Court declined to opine
on whether the condition present in Knights’s probation constituted
consent for the purposes of waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. 46
After the Knights decision, there were two viable methods for
conducting warrantless searches of probationers that satisfied the Fourth
constitutional, the search in Griffin was supported by reasonable suspicion and thus the Court left
open the issue of suspicionless searches. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268-69 (D.
Mass. 2007). Probation is “a court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to stated conditions,
releases a convicted person into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or prison.”
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). In contrast, parole is “the release of a prisoner from
imprisonment before the full sentence has been served.” Id. Parole is not always available, but is
traditionally granted for good behavior, subject to certain conditions. Id. “The essence of parole is
release from prison, before completion of the sentence, on condition that the prisoner abide by
certain rules during the balance of the sentence. Parole is not freedom.” 59 AM. JUR. 2D Pardon
and Parole § 6 (1987).
42. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
43. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. But see United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005)
(determining that reasonable suspicion is not a necessary factor for probationer searches where the
probationer has signed a waiver of his Fourth Amendment protections). The Seventh Circuit is the
only circuit which has eliminated reasonable suspicion as a requirement for searches of
probationers. Reindl, supra note 6, at 124. The Seventh Circuit explains, “not only was a
probationer’s expectation of privacy diminished, it was eliminated by contract.” Id. at 131.
44. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
45. Id. at 120. Probationers have a large incentive to conceal their criminal activities and to
dispose of evidence that could incriminate them because they are aware that they are being closely
monitored and if they are caught in an illegal activity, or activity that violates the conditions of their
probation, they will be subject to revocation of their probation, which quite possibly will mean
incarceration for many probationers. Id. Further, the revocation proceedings do not afford the
protections offered in a criminal trial. Id. Specifically, there is no right to a jury trial or
requirement that the offenses be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a probation revocation
hearing. Id.
46. Id. at 118. In Knights, the State argued that Knights voluntarily accepted a search
requirement as a condition of not going to prison. Id. The Court refused to decide the case on
consent grounds, but concluded that “the search of Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth
Amendment approach of ‘examining the totality of the circumstances,’ with the probation search
condition being a salient circumstance.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Amendment, yet neither case sheds light on how to handle searches
lacking suspicion. 47
3. California Strips Away Parolees’ Rights
In 1998, the Supreme Court of California analyzed the issue of
parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights in People v. Reyes. 48 Previous
precedent dictated that a parolee subject to a search condition retained a
diminished expectation of privacy; therefore, any search of his person
must be supported by reasonable suspicion. 49
Despite this precedent, the Court found that reasonable suspicion is
not mandatory to search a parolee. 50 The Court also determined that the
consent exception did not apply because, under California statute, parole
is not a choice for the prisoner. 51 The Court applied the traditional
47. United State v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269 (D. Mass 2007). The Knights court
extended the Griffin decision to cover all searches of probationers with reasonable suspicion, even
those that were investigative, and not probationary as required to meet the special needs analysis of
Griffin. Reindl, supra note 6, at 130.
48. People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1998). Reyes was released on California state parole,
subject to a search condition. Id. at 446. After receiving an anonymous tip, Reyes’s parole officer
contacted police and asked them to find out if Reyes was using drugs. Id. Police searched a shed at
Reyes’s residence and found small amounts of methamphetamine. Id. The trial court denied
Reyes’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion. Id.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding no reasonable suspicion. Id. The California Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide if the search of a parolee’s residence requires reasonable suspicion. Id.
49. People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1269 (Cal. 1986) (holding that a search of a parolee in
California must have a parole supervision purpose). Thus, a parolee search:
must be based on information which leads the parole agent who conducts or authorizes
the search to believe that the parolee has violated the law or another condition of his
parole, or is planning on doing so. Were this not so, a parole search would not only
invade the parolee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, but would unreasonably intrude
into the privacy interests of persons with whom the parolee associates or resides.
Id. In In re Tyrell J., the court moved one step further in the case of juveniles, declaring that
juvenile probationers have no reasonable expectation of privacy. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521
(Cal. 1994) (“Because the minor was subject to a valid condition of probation that required him to
submit to warrantless searches by ‘any’ law enforcement officer, he had no reasonable expectation
of privacy . . . .”). The Court in Tyrell noted that there is a difference between adult probation and
juvenile probation that makes it possible that “a condition of probation that would be
unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor
under the supervision of the juvenile court.” Id. at 526.
50. Reyes, 968 P.2d at 447 (“[A] probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable,’ the court stopped short of equating
reasonableness with particularized suspicion.”) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
51. Id. at 448. The consent justification cannot operate in accordance with the Determinate
Sentencing Act. Burgener, 714 P.2d at 1266. The act mandates a minimum term of three years
parole for all prisoners who have served a determinate term. Id. at n.12. The parolee has no choice
as to whether to accept the parole, and “[t]he Board of Prison Terms has no discretion to grant or
withhold parole to a prisoner who has served a determinate term.” Id. Voluntary consent cannot be
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balancing test and determined that, because of his status, a parolee has a
significantly diminished, but still existent, liberty to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 52 California has a significant
interest in determining whether parolees obey the law. 53 The state’s
interest coupled with the fact that the parolee put himself in the situation
where it became necessary for the state to monitor his behavior results in
the balance tipping in favor of the state. 54 Safeguards, such as
California’s prohibition against arbitrary, capricious, or harassing
searches, provide sufficient protection for the parolee’s diminished
Fourth Amendment rights. 55
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
In September 2002, while Donald Curtis Samson was walking
down a public street, he was approached by Officer Alex Rohleder of the
San Bruno Police Department. 56 At the time of the stop, Samson was on
found in the absence of choice, and therefore “Section 3000, subdivision (a), is a mandatory ‘kickout’ [provision].” Id. The California legislature has found that “the period immediately following
incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive
citizenship.” Brief for the Petitioner at 1-2, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Further, to
“provide for the supervision of and surveillance of parolees,” and “to provide educational,
vocational, family and personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in the transition between
imprisonment and discharge,” California law requires that a sentence include parole. Id.
52. Burgener, 714 P.2d at 1267. The “conditions which necessitate and thereby justify total
curtailment of a prisoner’s Fourth Amendment rights are not present once he is free on parole.” Id.
53. Reyes, 968 P.2d at 450 (“[T]he threat of a suspicionless search is fully consistent with the
deterrent purposes of the search condition. The purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of a
defendant is to ascertain whether the parolee is complying with the terms of parole; to determine not
only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. Information obtained under
such circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given
the defendant.”).
54. See id. at 450-51; see also supra note 30 (comparing the burden that a prisoner must face
in the balancing test). “The level of intrusion is de minimis and the expectation of privacy greatly
reduced when the subject of the search is on notice that his activities are being routinely and closely
monitored. Moreover, the purpose of the search condition is to deter the commission of crimes and
to protect the public, and the effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by the potential for random
searches.” Id. at 451.
55. Id. (explaining that a parolee search would be unreasonable “if made too often, or at an
unreasonable hour, or if unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or
oppressive conduct by the searching officer”). But see infra note 108 (discussing how California’s
prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, and harassing searches provides little protection for parolees).
56. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846(2006). Samson was stopped on September 6,
2002, while walking “along a busy thoroughfare between a residential area and a major shopping
area, near ‘family homes’ and a school” in San Bruno, California, with a woman, Deborah Watson
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California state parole. 57 Rohleder conducted a search of Samson’s
person based solely on Samson’s parolee status, pursuant to provisions
of the California Penal Code. 58 Upon searching Samson, Rohleder
and her three-year-old son. People v. Samson, No. A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, *1-2 (Cal. App.
1st Dist. Oct. 14, 2004), aff’d, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); see also Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
57. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846. Samson had been convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, had served prison time, and had been released on parole. Id. California parole operates
distinctively from other state parole systems. As detailed in the California Penal Code, “[a]t the
expiration of a term of imprisonment . . . the inmate shall be released on parole . . . unless . . . the
parole authority for good cause waives parole and discharges the inmate from the custody of the
department.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(b)(1) (West 2006) (emphasis added). Under the
Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, the state of California announced to the public that parole is
not a choice. People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 448 (Cal. 1998). The prisoner must be offered parole,
and he must accept it. Id. Though the California legislature continues to refer to parole as a
privilege, the practical application of parole vests a right in a prisoner who has been imprisoned for
a prescribed period of time to be released on parole regardless of whether the inmate is prepared to
integrate into society. Samson, 547 U.S. at 854. The theory of parole as a privilege or an “act of
grace” was rejected by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer. Brief for the Petitioner at 13,
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). According to a study by the Justice Policy Center of the
Urban Institute, less than one percent of prisoners released on California state parole are released as
a result of a discretionary ruling by a parole board. Jeremy Travis & Sarah Lawrence, Beyond the
Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America, JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, URBAN INSTITUTE 4 (Nov.
5, 2002), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310583 [hereinafter URBAN INSTITUTE].
California is one of the few states (Oregon and Rhode Island, also) that place almost all prisoners on
some form of supervision following release. Id. at 9. “Consequently, inmates may be released early
regardless of their capacities to reintegrate themselves into society or the threat they pose to the
communities to which they return. Many parolees, perhaps most of them, require intense
supervision.” Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 16, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
58. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846-47. Rohleder was aware that Samson was on parole through
prior contact with Samson. Id. at 846. Initially Rohleder thought that there was a parole violation
warrant for Samson’s arrest. Id. Rohleder first conducted a pat-down search of Samson for
weapons, and found none. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Upon questioning, Samson informed Rohleder that there was no warrant. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846.
Officer Rohleder confirmed through radio dispatch that there was no warrant for Samson’s arrest
and that Samson was on California state parole. Id. Rohleder decided to conduct a search of
Samson pursuant to California statute. Id. Rohleder waited to conduct the parolee search until
another officer arrived on the scene between two and ten minutes later. Respondent’s Brief on the
Merits at 4, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). The pertinent California statute reads,
“Any inmate who is eligible for release on parole pursuant to this chapter shall agree in writing to
be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or
night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a)
(West 2006). Officer Rohleder also asked Deborah Watson, Samson’s companion, to empty her
pockets. People v. Samson, 2004 WL 2307111, at *2. Officer Rohleder did not find anything
incriminating on Watson’s person, and instructed her to leave the scene. Id. Officer Rohleder
testified that Watson consented to the search, while Watson maintained that Officer Rohleder never
asked for her permission before instructing that she empty her pockets. Id. The Samson Court
found that an officer must know that a person is on parole prior to the search in order to use the
California statute permitting parolee searches as a justification for the search. See United States v.
Felix, No. 06cr1948 BTM, 2007 WL 173892, *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2007) (noting that the
government’s contention that a defendant’s parolee status limits his expectation of privacy to such a
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found a small amount of methamphetamine. 59 Pursuant to California
law, the state charged Samson with possession of methamphetamine. 60
B. Procedural History
At trial, the judge denied Samson’s motion to suppress the
methamphetamine found on his person at the time of his arrest. 61 The
jury convicted Samson, sentencing him to seven years imprisonment. 62
Samson appealed to the California Court of Appeals. 63 The Appeals
degree that he cannot protest to a search made by officers who are not aware of his parolee status is
not supported by the Court’s decision in Samson).
59. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847. The drugs were found in a plastic baggie inside of a cigarette
box, located in Samson’s left breast pocket. Id.
60. Id. Samson was charged pursuant to a California statute which reads in relevant part,
“every person who possesses any controlled substance . . . unless upon the prescription of a
physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian, licensed to practice in this state, shall be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than one year or in the state prison.” CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a) (West 2006).
61. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847. The judge found that California statute authorized the search,
and Officer Rohleder did not perform the search in an arbitrary or capricious manner, therefore,
there was no ground on which to grant Samson’s motion to suppress the evidence. Id. A San Mateo
County jury found Samson guilty. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 4, Samson v. California, 547
U.S. 843 (2006).
62. Id.; see also supra note 60 (explaining that the statutory authority for Samson’s charge
authorizes a maximum term of up to one year in jail). Samson’s enhanced sentence of seven years
was assigned according to California codes stating, “[i]f a defendant has one prior felony conviction
that has been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term
shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction,” CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(1) (West 2006), and:
where the new offense is any felony for which a prison sentence is imposed, in addition
and consecutive to any other prison terms therefore, the court shall impose a one-year
term for each prior separate prison term served for any felony; provided that no
additional term shall be imposed under this subdivision for any prison term served prior
to a period of five years in which the defendant remained free of both prison custody and
the commission of an offense which results in a felony conviction.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (West 2006). Specifically, the trial court found that Samson “had
committed four prior felonies, including in 1997 the possession by a felon of a firearm, in violation
of the California Penal Code for which he was on parole at the time of the search.” Respondent’s
Brief on the Merits at 4, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Samson challenged the trial
court’s imposition of an upper term at the California Court of Appeals. People v. Samson, No.
A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, *3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2004) aff’d, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Samson unsuccessfully argued that the trial court had committed an error due to the recent Supreme
Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because there was no jury finding to
support the imposition of an upper term. Id. The Supreme Court later validated Samson’s argument
in Cunningham v. California. 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (holding that California’s determinate
sentencing law which allowed judges, not juries, to find facts leading to enhanced sentencing
violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial). The Appellate Court found that Samson had forfeited
any claim he may have had by failing to request a jury trial, and further, that this issue was deemed
waived on appeal because it was not raised at trial. Samson, 2004 WL 2307111, at *4.
63. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847. Samson argued that the drug evidence should have been

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 6
LYNCH_FINAL

668

3/23/2009 2:56 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:651

Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. 64 Relying on California
case law, the Appeals Court repeated that suspicionless searches of
parolees are permissible under California law. 65 In 1998, the California
Supreme Court held in People v. Reyes that searching a parolee does not
require individualized suspicion. 66 The Supreme Court of California,
having already decided the issue, denied Samson’s petition for
certiorari. 67
C. Supreme Court’s Decision
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
constitutionality of California’s suspicionless search in light of the

suppressed at trial because it was the product of an illegal search. Id. The search was illegal, first,
because it was not performed in response to a reasonable suspicion and, second, because the search
was arbitrary, capricious, and harassing. Samson, 2004 WL 2307111, at *2-3. The state argued that
the search was valid according to California statute and was performed for legitimate rehabilitative
and governmental purposes and therefore was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. Id. Samson
also set forth a Blakely v. Washington claim, alleging that his Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated by the trial court based on the way they had calculated his sentence. Id. at *3. The Court
of Appeals declined to make a finding on this issue, but held that any error that could have occurred
at trial was harmless. Id. at *7. The appellate court issued Samson three days of credit toward his
prison term. Id. at *3.
64. Samson, 2004 WL 2307111, at *11. The unpublished opinion of the California Appeals
Court was written by Judge Swager. Id. at *1. The appellate court reviews the trial court’s denial
of a motion to suppress de novo. United States v. Lopez, 474 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2007).
65. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847; see also supra note 58 (quoting the text of the California statute
which authorizes suspicionless searches of parolees). The court relied primarily on People v. Reyes,
968 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1998).
66. In Reyes, a parolee’s premises were searched pursuant to an anonymous tip that parolee
was using drugs. Reyes, 968 P.2d at 446. The court held that search of a parolee does not require
reasonable suspicion, because a parolee’s expectation of privacy is not violated unless the search is
arbitrary, harassing, or not conducted pursuant to a parole condition. Id. at 450-51. The Court did
not consider whether or not there was actual reasonable suspicion in this situation, but an opinion
concurring only in the judgment by Justice Kennard found reasonable suspicion. Id. at 453
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
67. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847. The California Supreme Court denied Samson’s petition for
certiorari without prejudice, in anticipation of a change in California law regarding Samson’s
position as a result of the decisions in People v. Black and People v. Towne. People v. Samson, No.
A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, *2-3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2004), aff’d, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
The California Supreme Court also relied on precedent. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847. “Stare decisis
encourages courts to follow their own prior decisions, and it requires lower courts to follow
decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction.” WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL
ARGUMENT 42 (Carolina Academic Press 2002). However, there are some discrepancies in whether
the Reyes case actually creates precedent that the court must follow. See supra note 66 (noting that
reasonable suspicion may have been present in Reyes). Stare decisis only applies to the holding of
prior cases, not to judicial reasoning that is unnecessary to the decision and therefore has no binding
effect on other courts. HUHN, supra, at 42.
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reasonable expectation of privacy afforded to citizens under the Fourth
Amendment. 68
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the California Court of
Appeals in a six to three decision, finding that a parolee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is severely diminished. 69 The Court used a
Fourth Amendment balancing test to weigh the state’s interests against
Samson’s expectation of privacy. 70 In order to determine the privacy
interests of a parolee, the Court looked to several cases. 71 First, the
Court recognized in Griffin v. Wisconsin that there exists a continuum of
possible punishments, stretching from lengthy prison terms to probation
Parole falls somewhere in between
or community service. 72
imprisonment and probation on this continuum; therefore, parolees have
an expectation of privacy somewhere between that of a probationer 73
and a prisoner. 74 The Supreme Court, in Morrissey v. Brewer, found
that parole lies closer to imprisonment on the continuum, remarking that
“parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted
criminals. . . . The essence of parole is release from prison, before the
completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abides by
certain rules during the balance of the sentence.” 75 The extent of the
68. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847. The Fourth Amendment states:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The issue of whether California’s suspicionless search violates the Fourth
Amendment is one of first impression for the Supreme Court. In United States v. Knights, the court
looked to a probationer search conducted pursuant to reasonable suspicion and left the status of
suspicionless searches up in the air. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); see supra
Part II.C.2.
69. Samson, 547 U.S. at 857. Justice Thomas authored the opinion of the Court and was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Alito.
Id. at 845.
70. Id. at 848.
71. Id. at 848-52.
72. Id. at 848. The Supreme Court in Griffin identifies several other possible punishments,
including solitary confinement in a maximum security prison, confinement in a maximum, medium,
or minimum security prison, work release programs, halfway houses, community service hours, and
probation. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
73. Samson, 547 U.S. at 850; see Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (explaining probationers’ lowered
expectations of privacy); see also supra Part II.C.2.
74. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (noting that prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy by virtue of the institutional setting).
75. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). The Court in Morrissey further explains
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conditions placed on parolees is demonstrative of the lowered
expectations of privacy that parolees have as a result of their status. 76
Finally, because a parolee is aware of the conditions placed upon him
and has signed off on them, the parolee does not have an expectation of
remaining free from suspicionless searches that society would recognize
as legitimate. 77
On the other hand, the state’s interests are considerable. The state
has an interest in imposing harsher supervision on parolees because
parolees are more likely to commit future crimes. 78 Parole restrictions
combat recidivism, promote reintegration of parolees into the
community, and encourage positive citizenship among parolees. 79 In
that revocation of parole does not deprive a parolee of “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependant on observance of special parole
restrictions.” Id. at 480. But see William R. Rapson, Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure
Protection to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L. REV. 129, 133 (1969) (“[I]n most cases the life of
a parolee more nearly resembles that of an ordinary citizen than that of a prisoner. The parolee is
not incarcerated; he is not subjected to a prison regimen, to the rigors of prison life and the
unavoidable company of sociopaths. . . . The parolee lives among people who are free to come and
go when and as they wish. Except for the conditions of parole, he is one of them.”). “The liberty of
a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the values of unqualified liberty.” Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 482.
76. Samson, 547 U.S. at 851. Parolees endure considerable restrictions on their liberty while
on parole. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478. Typical restrictions include, but are not limited to, parolees
being forbidden to drink alcohol and associate with certain people, particularly known criminals.
Id. Parolees must typically seek permission from their parole officer before moving, changing
employment, leaving the state for any reason, marrying, using or buying a vehicle, or incurring debt.
Id. Further, parolees must report to their assigned parole officer on regular intervals and make
periodic written reports to the parole officer. Id. Parolees are not permitted to own or use weapons.
URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 57. Failure to meet these conditions can result in the parolee being
returned to prison for the remainder of their term. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478-79. In Samson, “the
Court ‘back-tracked’ on its past findings that probationers and parolees are owed the same
diminished expectations of privacy.” Reindl, supra note 6, at 135. The Court explained that the
government’s concern from both Knights and Griffin of preventing concealment of crime is an even
stronger argument when applied to parolees. Id. The Court distinguished the public risk of
releasing prisoners on parole from the lesser risk of probationers who have not been imprisoned and
may have committed minor crimes. Id.
77. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852; see supra note 51 (detailing earlier court’s handling of the
consent exception). The Supreme Court declined to decide Samson on consent grounds. See
Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n.3; see also Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Searches, Parolees,
Reasonableness,
and
GPS,
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/2006/06/
searches_of_parolees.html#more (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
78. Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (citing Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524
U.S. 357, 365 (1998); see supra note 45 (discussing the reasons that probationers are more likely to
commit crimes than those not on probation).
79. Id. See also supra note 75 (listing common parole restrictions). Advocates of parole
contend,
the period immediately following incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of
the offender into society and to positive citizenship. It is in the interest of public safety
for the state to provide for the supervision of and surveillance of parolees and to provide
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California, there is a sixty-eight to seventy percent recidivism rate
among parolees, highlighting the State’s heightened interest in
combating parolee recidivism and the grave safety concerns created by
parolees on the street. 80
The Court found that the balance tips sharply in favor of allowing
California the right to combat recidivism using a method that works for
California’s specific problems. 81 Requiring individual suspicion would
undermine the state’s ability to effectively supervise parolees and thus
give parolees a greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal
their criminal activity. 82
The Court quickly dismissed an array of other arguments Samson
offered. 83 First, the Court said there is no merit to the argument that a
majority of states and the Federal government required individualized
suspicion before allowing a warrantless search of a parolee. 84 Though
educational, vocational, family and personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in
the transition between imprisonment and discharge.
People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1267 (Cal. 1986).
80. Samson, 547 U.S. at 853-54. California’s grave safety concerns stem from the fact that
the state has the highest recidivism rates in the nation. Id. Further, sixty-two percent of parolees
nationwide come from only five states – California, Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois.
URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 57, at 14. California has the largest parole population, with parolees
comprising eighteen percent of total parolees nationwide in 2000. Id. California places ninety-eight
percent of its releases on parole; forty-two percent of parolees return to prison. Id. “A state’s
interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among
probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusion that would not otherwise be tolerated under the
Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 853; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 12, 26
(2003) (“[R]ecidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment and
is a serious public safety concern in California and the Nation.”). California’s use of this reasoning
“is no pretext.” Id. “According to a recent report, approximately 67 percent of former inmates
released from state prisons were charged with at least one ‘serious’ new crime within three years of
their release.” Id. But see Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 16, Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843 (2006) (“[Petitioner] overlooks the deterrent value of a suspicionless search, which will
promote obedience to the law and positive citizenship.”).
81. URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 57, at 14. Sixty-five percent of prison admissions in
California are parole violators compared with thirty-five percent nationally. Id. However, “[i]t is
unlikely that the parolees in Utah and California, the two states with the lowest rates of successful
completion (under 20 percent) are so inherently different from the parolees in Massachusetts and
Mississippi, the two states who successful completion rates exceed 80 percent.” Id. at 19.
82. Samson, 547 U.S. at 854; see supra note 45 (explaining probationers motivation to
conceal criminal activities). Parolees have an even greater motivation to conceal their criminal
activities, as they often face lengthy prison sentences in the event of a revocation. See URBAN
INSTITUTE, supra note 57, at 21; Samson 547 U.S. at 862 (Stevens J., dissenting) (“Parolees
typically will have committed more serious crimes . . . than probationers.”).
83. Samson, 547 U.S. at 855-57.
84. Id. at 855. Although, the Court declared that what other jurisdictions do does not affect
what the Constitution requires, it is still helpful to realize the differences between states. In 2005,
the Third Circuit found that warrantless searches “imposed as a condition of pretrial release required
a showing of probable cause, despite the defendant’s pre-release consent, as protecting the
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most states have decided to increase the requirements for searches, this
has no bearing upon the constitutional floor set by the Fourth
Amendment. 85 The Court also said that there is no merit to the
argument that suspicionless searches give blanket discretion to law
The Court concluded that California’s
enforcement officials. 86
prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches provides
sufficient protection for parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights and,
therefore, no additional procedural safeguards are necessary to protect
the rights of parolees. 87

community from further crime committed by the defendant did not amount to a ‘special need.’”
RINGEL, supra note 29.
85. Samson, 547 U.S. at 855.
A state law, even if passed in the exercise of the state's acknowledged powers, must
yield, in case of conflict, to the supremacy of the Federal Constitution. Indeed, even
state constitutions cannot subtract from the rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, but they can provide additional rights to their citizens, as the Federal
Constitution sets a floor for individual rights, while state constitutions establish a ceiling.
Therefore, a state constitution is of no effect where it is in conflict with the Constitution
of the United States, and provisions in state constitutions have often been held void as
inconsistent with federal constitutional provisions. However, a federal court will defer
to a state court's interpretation of its own state constitution.
16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 51 (2006). Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Samson, many questions regarding the constitutional floor set by the Fourth Amendment are left
unanswered. Courts may attempt to interpret Samson as to say that the Fourth Amendment does not
require individualized suspicion in any case. See United States v. Perkins, No. 05-CR-30137-DRH,
2006 WL 3718048, *2-4 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion for correctional
officers to search a parolee’s residence, thereby avoiding deciding whether reasonable suspicion is
still required for parolees’ residences post-Samson). States may also elect to set their floor higher
than that mandated by the Constitution, as Samson merely allows for searches absent individualized
suspicion but does not prevent states from requiring individualized suspicion. Id. For an example
of an issue where states give greater rights than the Constitution, see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.
654, 668 (2002), noting, “Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law right to appointed counsel
more generous than that afforded by the Federal Constitution.”
86. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856. Samson argued that suspicionless searches allow law
enforcement officials unlimited discretion to conduct searches. Id. Officers in turn inflict dignitary
harms on parolees, which encourage feelings of resentment in parolees and thwart efforts at
reintegration into society. Id.
87. Id. According to the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Reyes, it would be
unreasonable for a parolee search to be made too frequently, at an unreasonable time of day, of an
unreasonably long duration, or for arbitrary reasons. People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450-51 (Cal.
1998). An arbitrary or capricious search is defined as a search where “the motivation for the search
is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the
search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee.” Id. at 451. No California court has
ever found that a search of a parolee or probationer violated the standard prohibiting arbitrary,
capricious, or harassing searches. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Samson v. California, 547
U.S. 843 (2006).
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2. Justice Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens’s dissent 88 stressed his opposition to the majority’s
unprecedented decision. 89 While in the past the Court separately held
that searches of parolees based on suspicion and searches pursuant to a
state’s special need are constitutional, 90 the Samson Court combined
these holdings to make an unprecedented ruling that disregarded the
“closely guarded . . . category of constitutionally permissible
suspicionless searches.” 91
Justice Stevens attacked the majority’s questionable logic of
comparing parolees to prisoners for Fourth Amendment purposes. 92 The
majority ignored that parolees are not like prisoners. 93 Parolees are “set

88. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer in his dissent. Samson,
547 U.S. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. Justice Stevens notes that “prior cases have consistently assumed that the Fourth
Amendment provides some protection for probationers and parolees.” Id. Although that
“protection is not as robust as that afforded to ordinary citizens.” Id. (noting that the Court has held
reasonable suspicion searches of probationers permissible in Knights and has held that the
“supervisory responsibility of probation officers . . . may give rise to special needs justifying
departures from Fourth Amendment strictures” in Griffin). “But neither Knights nor Griffin
supports a regime of suspicionless searches, conducted pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion
untethered by any procedural safeguards, by law enforcement personnel who have no special
interest in the welfare of the parolee or probationer.” Id.
90. Id.; see United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (holding warrantless searches of
probationers permissible when reasonable suspicion is found); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868
(1987) (holding warrantless searches by probation officers permissible pursuant to a special need);
see also supra Part II.
91. Samson, 547 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
309 (1997)) (“[W]hat the Court sanctions today is an unprecedented curtailment of liberty.
Combining faulty syllogism with circular reasoning, the Court concludes that parolees have no more
legitimate an expectation of privacy in their persons that do prisoners.”). The Court’s decision in
Samson defines just how closely guarded the category of permissible warrantless searches will be.
92. Id. at 861. Justice Stevens explains:
Coupling the dubious holding of Hudson v. Palmer, with the bald statement that
“parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers,” the Court two-steps its
way through a faulty syllogism and, thus, avoids the application of the Fourth
Amendment principles altogether. The logic, apparently, is this: Prisoners have no
legitimate expectation of privacy; parolees are like prisoners; therefore, parolees have no
legitimate expectation of privacy.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 861. The court cites several cases showing that parolees are not like prisoners.
According to United States v. Williams, there are no constitutional differences between probationers
and parolees for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d
373, 376 (2005)). The dissent in Samson advocates an approach that requires using the traditional
balancing approach while keeping in mind that “the balance is not the same in prison as it is out.”
Samson, 547 U.S. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 37 (discussing the limited privacy
rights of a prisoner and the reasons behind this curtailment of liberty in the institutional setting).
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free in the world subject to restrictions intended to facilitate supervision
and guard against antisocial behavior.” 94
Suspicionless searches were the very problem the Framers intended
to dispel when they created the Fourth Amendment. 95 The Framers did
not intend for the general interest of the state in law enforcement to
supersede Fourth Amendment rights absent a showing of special needs
by the state. 96 A “broad nonspecific search power” was the evil the
The Framers required
Fourth Amendment intended to dispel. 97
individual suspicion, while making considerations for special needs so
long as safeguards and institutionalized processes were in effect to guide
and restrict law enforcement officers. 98
The dissent recognized that even if suspicionless searches of
parolees were not blatant infringements of parolees’ Fourth Amendment
rights, they did not serve any legitimate law enforcement purpose or
state interest set forth by the majority. 99 Further, California was a clear
outlier. 100 A majority of states and the federal government recognized
reasonable suspicion as the floor, absent special needs. 101 Reasonable
94. Samson, 547 U.S. at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Framers were attempting to stamp out writs of
assistance and general warrants, which placed liberty in the hands of every petty officer, and kept
the rights of citizens to be “subject to the discretion of the official in the field.” Id. at 858; see supra
Part II.A.
96. Samson, 547 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.A and accompanying
notes.
97. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term – Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 183, 186-87
[hereinafter Leading Cases]; see supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
98. Samson, 547 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting). California cannot impose a blanket
search condition on “all parolees – whatever the nature of their crimes, whatever their likelihood of
recidivism, and whatever their supervisory needs – without any programmatic procedural
protections.” Id. at 865.
99. Id. at 863. This decision does not further the goal of reintegrating parolees into the
community as the majority suggests. Id. at 864-65.
100. Id. at 863.
101. Id. at 864. “With the possible exception of North Dakota, no State other than California
permits police officers to engage in suspicionless, nonconsensual searches of parolees.” Brief for
the Petitioner at 28, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Thirty States require that nonconsensual parolee or probationer searches be based upon
reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds. In many of those jurisdictions authority to
search parolees based upon reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause is limited to
parole officers, or police officers working with parole officers. Two additional States
(Florida and Iowa) require that parolee searches be based upon probable cause even
when undertaken by a parole officer if the evidence will be used in a criminal trial. West
Virginia requires probable cause for parolee searches in all cases. Other States
(including Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota) have upheld parolee searches based
upon reasonable suspicion, without expressly holding that reasonable suspicion is
required. Where State courts have approved suspicionless searches of parolees or
probationers, they have done so on the basis of consent, an individualized determination
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suspicion was the shield the Framers selected to guard against the evils
of searches and seizures. 102
Further, Justice Stevens argued the decision in Hudson did not call
for a blanket loss of Fourth Amendment rights for prisoners. 103 Instead,
Justice Stevens reasoned that Hudson could best be understood as a
special needs case. 104 The prison has strong interests in internal security
and institutional needs that do not apply outside of the prison setting. 105
Using Hudson to stand for the proposition that prisoners have no Fourth
Amendment rights is a clear misinterpretation by the Court. 106
According to Justice Stevens, if searches absent reasonable
suspicion are to be allowed, the creation of programmatic safeguards to
ensure that the law is applied fairly is a necessity. 107 California’s
prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches simply does
not have the enforcement capabilities necessary to ensure that the Fourth
Amendment rights of parolees are not infringed upon. 108
by a court or parole board that a suspicionless search condition was reasonable, or by
limiting the authority to conduct the search to parole or probation officers.
Id. at 28-29. “The experience of these other jurisdictions confirms that governments have effective
means to advance their legitimate interests in supervising and searching parolees, and do not need to
impose an unlimited regime of suspicionless searches by police officers.” Id. at 29.
102. Samson, 547 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.A and accompanying
notes (discussing the reasons for the Framers including the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights).
103. Id. at 862-63; see supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Hudson v. Palmer).
104. Id. at 863 n.3. Generally, the Supreme Court has treated certain types of searches as
separate from the special needs exception, including administrative searches, border and checkpoint
searches, and other types of searches that are always considered reasonable. DRESSLER, supra note
5, at 339. Yet, there is no legitimate reason for distinguishing these categories of searches,
including the type of prisoner searches outlined in Hudson. Id. All of these types of searches
involve a specific governmental interest, or a special need, that is outside the ordinary need for
investigating crimes. Id. All of these searches are judged by the standard of reasonableness. Id.
105. Samson, 547 U.S. at 862.
106. Id. at 850 n.2, 860.
107. Id. at 860, 866. Safeguards include administrative procedures and other routines that
ensure that laws are applied blindly and limit discretion of police officers. Id. Seemingly as an
afterthought, the Court throws out the proposition that California’s prohibition on arbitrary,
capricious, and harassing searches provides sufficient safeguard to limit discretion. Id. See also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (holding that though the agents acted with restraint,
they were not bound by any safeguards). “In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never
sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a
particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with
that end.” Id.
108. Samson, 547 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[P]rogrammatic safeguards designed
to ensure evenhandedness in application [are necessary] if individualized suspicion is to be
jettisoned, it must be replaced with measures to protect against the state actor’s unfettered
discretion.”). See also Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (“[B]road
statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review.”). See supra note 87 (discussing
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Court’s chosen framework for analyzing Samson was only one
of three options the Court could have chosen to make their decision. 109
Reasonableness, 110 consent, 111 and the special needs exception 112 are all
viable means of analyzing Fourth Amendment challenges. 113 The
Court’s choice of the reasonableness framework is not surprising given
the California Supreme Court’s decision that consent is not a viable
rationale in California and the special needs framework, which arguably
applies to the Samson case, is a much more rigid standard to meet than
using mere reasonableness. 114
A. The Reasonableness Standard is not the Appropriate Standard for
Limiting Fourth Amendment Protections
Traditionally, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment was interpreted to require a warrant prior to a search unless
the search met a previously recognized exception. 115 These exceptions

the definition of the arbitrary, capricious, and harassing standard).
The California Supreme Court has attempted to address some of these problems by
holding that a suspicionless parolee search is unlawful if it is “arbitrary and capricious”
because “the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative, or
legitimate law enforcement purposes” because it is “motivated by personal animosity
toward the parolee,” or because it is undertaken by police “at their whim or caprice” and
therefore “a form of harassment.” In practice, this “arbitrary, capricious, and harassing”
standard does not limit the discretion of law enforcement officers. Indeed, so far as we
can determine, no California court has ever held that a search of a parolee or probationer
was arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. This result is not surprising. So long as the
officer states that the motivation for the search is related to the “legitimate law
enforcement purpose” of searching for evidence of criminal activity, the search is not
arbitrary, capricious, or harassing under California's standard.
Brief for the Petitioner at 20, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
109. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining the traditional way that Fourth Amendment claims were
analyzed) and supra Part III.C.1 (detailing the Samson Court’s reasoning).
110. See supra Part II.B.1.
111. See supra Part II.B.2.
112. See supra Part II.B.3.
113. See supra note 33 (validating more than one possible method for assessing the
Constitutionality of Fourth Amendment searches).
114. See infra Part IV.B.
115. The Fourth Amendment only forbids searches deemed unreasonable, but the Court’s view
of reasonableness has changed considerably since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.
Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 358. In the 1950s, the Supreme Court took a broader and more elastic
view of what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure, but since that time, the Court has
increasingly looked to the procedures outlined in the warrant requirement as a means of interpreting
reasonableness. Id. Using this reasoning, the Court has condemned warrantless searches, subject
only to a few exceptions. Id. These exceptions fall into three categories - consent searches, routine
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are essentially situations in which the balancing test has already been
applied and the court has determined that the balance falls in favor of
allowing the search in every circumstance. 116 Samson provides an
example – the balance between parolee’s rights and the state’s needs
falls in favor of the state in every instance no matter the particular
circumstances of the case or the particular crime involved. 117 Creating
another broad exception to the rule, the Samson Court held that all
searches of parolees are reasonable. 118 This stands in stark contrast to
past precedent calling for a case-by-case analysis for reasonableness and
limiting the number of exceptions. 119
searches, and searches conducted under circumstances that make the warrant requirement
impracticable. Id.
116. It may be said that the Court only makes the ruling that the state’s interests will always
outweigh a person’s Fourth Amendment rights in a given situation in rare circumstances. For
example, in Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court declined to make a blanket exception to the rule
requiring officers to knock and announce their presence before entering a home for cases in which
there is a fear that evidence may be destroyed. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (holding
that while the Fourth Amendment typically requires officers to knock and announce their presence,
a no-knock search can be justified by the circumstances of the case). Instead, each time officers
wish to bypass the knock and announce rule, a ruling is made on a case-by-case basis by a
magistrate. Id. Two years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court found that, “[i]n order to
justify a 'no-knock' entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that
it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). Further, “if a per se exception were
allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable – albeit
hypothetical – risk of danger to officers of destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce
element of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.” Id. “The
fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock
entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police
decision not to knock and announce in a particular case.” Id.
117. Samson, 547 U.S. at 843. This reasoning is rather easy to swallow when one thinks about
a habitual drug user or person in possession of illegal firearms, but it becomes much harder to
stomach when offenders of non-possession crimes are brought into the mix. See id. at 865 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In essence, the Court is saying that the state’s interest in overseeing parolees and
making sure they do not recommit crimes justifies suspicionless searches of all parolees –
“whatever the nature of their crimes, whatever their likelihood of recidivism, and whatever their
supervisory needs.” Id.
118. Id. at 847 (majority opinion). The Samson Court does add that not all searches of parolees
are reasonable – those that are arbitrary, capricious or harassing are prohibited. Id. at 856; see also
supra note 87 and infra Part IV.A.3. All California parolees paroled after January 1, 1997, are
subject to the mandatory search condition. United States v. Akin, 213 F. App’x 606 (9th Cir. Dec.
20, 2006).
119. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 10 (2006) (“Whether a search or seizure is reasonable is determined
on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances, and balancing the intrusion on
an individual’s privacy and related interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”). The facts of each case will necessarily differ; as such, the inquiry should extend to “all
surrounding circumstances and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” Id. What is reasonable in
one instance will not necessarily be reasonable “in a different setting or with respect to another kind
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1. The Court Incorrectly Applied Past Precedent Regarding the
Reasonableness Standard to Find the Samson Search
Reasonable
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 120
As noted, this rule is typically suspended when probable cause exists,
when obtaining a warrant is impracticable, or when some other
recognized exception is present. 121
In United States v. Place, the government sought to authenticate a
warrantless search by declaring it reasonable according to the Fourth
Amendment because the officer had reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing. 122 The Court felt that searches supported only by
of material.” Id. The reasonableness of each search must be evaluated based on the facts as they
were known to the officer and as they existed at the time of the search, not from a hindsight
perspective. Id. See, e.g., In re Jaime P., 146 P.3d 965 (Cal. 2006) (holding that an officer must
have knowledge of probationary status prior to conducting a search in order to justify the search on
those grounds).
120. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
121. Id. Warrantless searches and seizures of parolees are permissible because “the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures affords less protection to a
parolee than to an ordinary citizen;” therefore, the standards by which reasonableness is measured
“are lower than those applicable to ordinary citizens.” 59 AM. JUR. 2D Pardon and Parole § 126
(2006).
The measure of protection afforded a parolee lies in a determination of what constitutes a
reasonable search under the circumstances. The parole authority must be vested with the
power to investigate a parolee to ascertain whether a parole violation has occurred if it is
to fulfill its statutory function. Also, an exception to the warrant requirement may be
recognized where special needs, such as the needs of a state's parole system, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.
Id.
A parole search is reasonable if there is a reasonable nexus between the search and the
parole process, and a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that the parolee
has violated the terms of the parole or engaged in criminal activity; the parole agent
clearly has a parole supervision purpose in a search undertaken to obtain evidence of a
parole violation. . . . To have such a purpose, and to avoid an unreasonable invasion of
the parolee's privacy, a search must be based on information indicating that the parolee
has violated the law or another condition of parole.
Id. See also People v. Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (5th Dist. 1992) (holding that the fact that the
defendant was a parolee alone is not sufficient to conduct a search). See also supra notes 116
(listing exceptions the Court has made).
122. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983). Basically, the state is asking the
Court to take the principles of Terry v. Ohio and apply them to a larger array of search situations.
Id. “In Terry the Court first recognized ‘the narrow authority of police officers who suspect
criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual’s personal security based on less than
probable cause.’” Id. at 702. Specifically, the Court in Terry approved frisking of individuals for
the limited purpose of finding weapons so long as reasonable suspicion exists. Terry v. Ohio, 392
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reasonable suspicion were generally unreasonable, but did declare that in
some instances it may be proper to detain 123 persons or seize objects
based solely on reasonable suspicion. 124 Never before has the Court
held that a search lacking probable cause or reasonable suspicion is
reasonable according to the Fourth Amendment absent special needs. 125
The Samson Court did not seek to validate the search of Samson
pursuant to special needs. 126
The Court has continuously held that the chief regulating structure
of the Fourth Amendment is the presence of a neutral and detached
magistrate, to determine “when the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search.” 127 Searches unreviewed by an impartial
U.S. 1 (1968). “The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person
recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the
reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of ‘the Fourth Amendment’s
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Place, 462 U.S. at 703. The
Court must “balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When
the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than probable
cause.” Id. Further, the Terry Court required that a frisk for weapons “be confined in scope to an
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the
assault of the police officer.” Brief for the Petitioner at 19, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843
(2006).
123. While it is generally true that “seizures of property are generally less intrusive than
seizures of the person,” when the authorities do not make it absolutely clear how they plan to
reunite the suspect and his possessions at some future time and place, seizure of the object is
tantamount to seizure of the person. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708. “This is because that person must
either remain on the scene or else seemingly surrender his effects permanently to the police.” Id. at
708 n.8; 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
9.6 (1982 Supp.). Important factors to consider when analyzing the seizure of a person’s property
include the length of the detention and the police diligence in quickly pursuing the investigation.
Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
124. Place, 462 U.S. at 698. “[G]iven the enforcement problems associated with the detection
of narcotics trafficking and the minimal intrusion that a properly limited detention would entail,” the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit detention of persons or things. Id. The key to determining the
reasonableness of such detentions is the length of detention and amount of intrusion necessary to
accomplish the task. Id.
125. See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (allowing searches of
probationers with reasonable suspicion); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (declaring
warrantless searches of probationers constitutional pursuant to a special need of the state).
126. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 858-59 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority
in Samson remarks that a special needs analysis was not necessary because their holding was based
on general Fourth Amendment principles. Id. at n.3 (majority opinion).
127. Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 529. See also 68 AM. JUR. 2D
Searches and Seizures § 197 (2006) (“Review of a search warrant application by an impartial
magistrate ensures that a neutral and detached evaluation of the situation is interposed between the
investigating officers and the private citizen.”). Though parolee searches are different from search
warrants, an analogy can be made to the proper role that a magistrate should play in the process.
See also 79 C.J.S. Searches § 182 (2006) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a warrant
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magistrate pose great risks to the foundation of the criminal justice
system. 128
These risks illustrate the need for individualized suspicion and
evaluation by a neutral magistrate in order to secure the reasonableness
of a search. 129 Never before has the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness been construed to allow such a suspicionless search. 130
The Supreme Court in Samson chooses to ignore the historical usage of
issue from a neutral and detached judicial officer rests upon the desirability of having magistrates
rather than police officers determine when searches and seizures are permissible and what
limitations should be placed upon such activities. A magistrate must perform his or her neutral and
detached function, and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police, and must make an
independent determination concerning probable cause.”). These analogies from the warrant
requirements are particularly relevant given that “if a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.” Camara,
387 U.S. at 539. This determination “is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or government enforcement agent.” Id. at 529.
128. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967). Searches without warrants are
condemnable because officers:
were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable
cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during
the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a
specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to
notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of
such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that
officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily
confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.
Id. Further, searches conducted without the authorization and oversight of a magistrate bypass “the
safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause,” and substitute “the far
less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly
influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.” Id. at 358.
129. See supra Part II.A -B.
130. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006). The following details are
particularly relevant: Samson was walking down the street with a woman and child, Officer
Rohleder verified that Samson had no warrants and was in good standing with his parole officer, the
drugs were found inside a cigarette box inside Samson’s pocket, Samson was on parole for being a
felon in possession of a firearm. Id. Also, recall that Samson’s possession of a small amount of
methamphetamine would not have been grounds for parole revocation in California. Id. at 859 n.1
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Presumably, the California Legislature determined that it is unnecessary
and perhaps even counterproductive, as a means of furthering the goals of the parole system, to
reincarcerate former prisoners for simple possession.”). While California statute allows for
“participation in and completion of an appropriate drug treatment program” in lieu of parole
revocation for parolees found with illegal substances, the state decided to ignore this call from the
legislature and charge Samson with a new offense. Brief for the Petitioner at 35-36, Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3063.1(a) (West 2006) (“Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, and except as provided in subdivision (d), parole may not be suspended
or revoked for commission of a nonviolent drug possession offense or for violating any drug-related
condition of parole.”). While “searches conducted without reasonable suspicion on the part of
searching officers should be considered presumptively violative of the implied term of
reasonableness,” searches such as the one in Samson provide further details that establish the
unreasonableness of the search. Reindl, supra note 6, at 169.
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the reasonableness requirement and instead rely on the fact that the
Fourth Amendment “imposes no irreducible requirement of such
[individualized] suspicion.” 131 Noting that the Court has only allowed
suspicionless searches in limited circumstances – special needs and
programmatic searches – the Court now opines that they have never held
that those are the only limited circumstances where suspicionless
searches could be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 132 The
Court thereby purports to create another category of reasonable
suspicionless searches – those of parolees – against the weight of
precedent. 133
2. The Court Understated Individual Rights and Overstated the
State’s Interests in Order to Create a Balance Tipping in Favor
of the State
First, the Supreme Court assumed prisoners and parolees to be
equal in terms of Fourth Amendment rights. 134 In reality, parolees are

131. Samson, at 2201 n.4 (majority opinion) (implying that because the Fourth Amendment
does not specifically require individualized suspicion in its text, individualized suspicion is not
always required). The majority assumes that because the Framers did not explicitly write that
individualized suspicion is required, it cannot be read into the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
despite historical evidence supporting the assumption that the Framers assumed individualized
suspicion to be required. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (1999).
132. Samson, 547 U.S. at 855 n.4. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 537 (“[P]ublic interest demands
that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing
technique would achieve acceptable results” in reference to the need for programmatic, routine
searches.); see supra note 29 (detailing the first usage of the term “special needs” and why the
exception is necessary).
133. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847.
134. “Prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy; parolees are like prisoners;
therefore, parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy. The conclusion is remarkable not
least because we have long embraced its opposite.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 861 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). “Contrary to the dissent’s contention, nothing in our recognition that parolees are more
akin to prisoners than probationers is inconsistent with our precedents. Nor, as the dissent suggests,
do we equate parolees with prisoners for the purpose of concluding that parolees, like prisoners,
have no Fourth Amendment rights.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 n.2 (majority opinion). While the
majority claims Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion is off base for contending that the majority
equates prisoners with parolees for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, they provide no support for
this contention. See id. The dissent points to Hudson in order to support their position, while the
majority ignores the specific holding of Hudson, that prisoners have Fourth Amendment rights but
their interests must fall to the pressures of internal security and institutional safety within the prison
walls. Id. Searches are not to be undertaken lightly, as they arouse more than a “petty indignity.”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). “It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and is not to be undertaken lightly.” Id. at
17.
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more like probationers than they are like prisoners. 135 Even so, Hudson
explains that limitations on prisoners Fourth Amendment rights occur
because of institutional reasons. 136 These concerns simply do not exist
for parolees because they have been allowed to leave the institutional
setting and return to the community. 137
Second, the Court never made clear the particular state interests
justifying the search, instead remarking that California’s grave safety
concerns justify California in dealing with its parolees in any manner it
deems proper. 138 States in general, not California specifically, have an

135. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Although the Court’s recent trend
has included a backing away from the idea that probationers and parolees are similar and that
searches of both groups require reasonable suspicion, probationers and parolees remain quite
similar. Reindl, supra note 6, at 134. Like probationers, parolees are set free in the community.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open
to persons who have never been convicted of any crime.” Id. For example, he “can be gainfully
employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of
normal life.” Id. Life of a parolee is considerably different from confinement in a prison. Id.
Parolees live a relatively normal life. Id. It makes sense to “attach greater importance to a person’s
justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom so long as he abides by the conditions of
his release, than to his mere ‘anticipation or hope of freedom.’” Id. at 495 n.8. A parolee’s liberty
“includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous
loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Id. The majority in Samson fails to justify why the
standard should be different for parolees and probationers, instead relying on unspoken assumptions
that parolees commit more crime than probationers and are less able to be trusted. John D.
Castiglione, Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity, and the Fourth
Amendment, 68 LA. L. REV. 63, 74 (2007).
136. See supra Part II.C.1 and accompanying notes.
137. Parolees are set free in the community subject to certain restrictions; therefore, concerns
of the institutional setting cannot apply. See supra note 135.
138. Samson, 547 U.S. at 853-54. Further, Samson “has not shown that the States on whose
decisions he relies have a parolee population or supervision problem which is remotely comparable
to that of California. Each State must be permitted to address and resolve its social issues in its own
fashion, with due regard for the constitutional rights of those affected.” Respondent’s Brief on the
Merits at 19, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). The Supreme Court has determined that
California’s interest in the “successful management of the parole system to ensure compliance with
parole conditions is overwhelming.” Id. at 13. Recidivism rates pose a serious threat to public
safety and California and throughout the states. Id. at 14. Public safety is not a compelling
governmental interest. If a parolee is such a dangerous criminal, why is he out of prison, living and
working in the community? In the years since California’s adoption of the suspicionless search of
parolees, California’s recidivism rate remains one of the highest in the nation. See Samson, 547
U.S. at 865 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Suspicionless searches of parolees have not proven an
incentive for parolees to commit fewer parole violations. Id. The majority in Samson seems to rely
on the fact that those who have been convicted of a crime are likely to reoffend, without any
comparison of crime rates between parolees and other individuals. Castiglione, supra note 135, at
74. It is speculative, at best, that subjecting parolees to suspicionless searches creates a greater
sense of respect for the law in parolees rather than producing resentment of the law and society. Id.
Even accepting this flawed argument, propensity evidence is not typically seen as strong enough to
support a curtailment of Constitutional rights. Id.
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interest in ensuring that parolees obey the law. 139 Nevertheless, general
interests in law enforcement do not trump constitutional rights. 140
California may deal with crime control in any manner that does not
interfere with constitutional rights.
B. Both Consent and Special Needs Fail to Validate Blanket
Suspicionless Searches of Parolees
Searches have been validated based on consent of the person being
searched in order to bypass an analysis of whether the search would have
otherwise been justifiable. 141 Other searches have been deemed valid
because a special need beyond law enforcement created a balance in
favor of the state. 142 Both of these methods fail to provide adequate
justification for suspicionless searches of parolees such as the search in
Samson.

139. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 13, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). The
Supreme Court has determined that California’s interest in the “successful management of the
parole system to ensure compliance with parole conditions is overwhelming.” Id. Recidivism rates
pose a serious threat to public safety in California and throughout the states. Id. at 14. Society also
has an interest in assuring that all citizens are treated with basic fairness – parolees are no exception.
Morrissey v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972). Fair treatment of parolees increases odds of
successful rehabilitation because reactions to arbitrary decisions are avoided. Id. California’s
interest in ensuring that parolees obey the law by providing maximum surveillance of their activities
has roots in Jeremy Bentham’s theory of prison design, aligning cells in a circle around a guard
station which inmates cannot see into. Leading Cases, supra note 97, at 183-84. The station may or
may not be manned at any given time. Id. Bentham’s “core idea – that supervision, real or
imagined, can deter crime and recidivism – continues to have staying power.” Id.
140. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that vehicle checkpoints
maintained for the purpose of catching drug traffickers are contrary to the Fourth Amendment);
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a policy of reporting pregnant
patients suspected of drug use to the authorities was “ultimately indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control”).
141. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Zap v. United States, 328
U.S. 624 (1946); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (“[P]olice officers act in full accord
with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise
the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding.”). Some
disagree with the consent rationale, claiming that getting rid of consent searches would “reaffirm a
belief that the police can solve crime by focusing not on hunches, but on suspicion and probable
cause” and eliminate the possibilities of police targeting citizens, coercing them into consenting, and
leaving the consenter feeling “diminished and angry.” Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 271-72 (2002). “It would mean that the Fourth Amendment’s
concern for the privacy of each citizen would be restored to its rightful place – to be interfered with
only when the government has the proper justification for doing so.” Id. at 272.
142. See, e.g., supra note 29 (listing many examples of special needs cases).
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1. Samson and the Consent Exception
The Samson Court purports to allow the California Supreme Court
to handle California’s consent issues. 143 In Reyes, the California
Supreme Court held that in California, searches of parolees cannot be
validated using the consent rationale. 144 Despite the lack of availability
of the consent rationale in California, at the very least, a parolee’s
acceptance of a search condition prior to parole severely diminishes that
parolee’s subjective expectation of privacy. 145
This begs the question of whether there existed valid consent by
Samson, or anyone similarly situated, for a search of his person at any
time without any suspicion. Although Samson did sign a document
containing his conditions of release, of which the search condition was a
part, there can be no valid consent without choice. 146 Traditional
notions of consent require a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver
of a known right, although the Supreme Court has rejected a strict
waiver test for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 147
143. See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 33-36, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843
(2006).
144. People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 448 (Cal. 1998) (“[T]he consent exception to the warrant
requirement may not be invoked to validate the search of an adult parolee because, under the
Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, parole is not a matter of choice.”). But see Respondent’s Brief
on the Merits at 36-37, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (“California parolees in general,
and petitioner in particular, are given a meaningful choice: conditional liberty with reduced Fourth
Amendment protection or continued incarceration with no expectation of privacy.”).
145. See Samson, 547 U.S. 843; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
146. The search condition imposed on Samson pursuant to California law, “provides for a
‘notice of parole,’ which is ‘a general description of rules and regulations governing parole.’ By
statute, ‘[t]he notice of parole shall read as follows: . . . Search. You and your residence and any
property under your control may be searched without a warrant at any time by any agent of the
Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer.’” Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Samson
v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). “An inmate who does not so agree loses ‘worktime credit on a
day-for-day basis and shall not be released until he or she either complies with the provision . . . or
has no remaining worktime credit, whichever occurs earlier.’” Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Samson
v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Essentially, a prisoner will “remain incarcerated until he signs
or until he has served his full sentence plus his statutory period of parole.” Respondent’s Brief on
the Merits at 10, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). “‘The parole authority shall revoke the
parole of any prisoner who refuses to’ take any of several specified actions, including ‘sign[ing] a
parole agreement setting forth the general and any special conditions applicable to the parole.’”
Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
147. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that a constitutional right may not be
waived unless there is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege”). The waiver standard can be divided into three parts.
First, the person must in fact have relinquished or abandoned the constitutional right in
question. Second, the relinquishment must be ‘voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.’
Third, the holder of the right must be aware of the nature of the right and of the primary
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An attempted justification of suspicionless searches of parolees
based on consent is futile at best. First, California has held that parolees
do not consent to parole. 148 While other states may not agree, the
Supreme Court has declined to make this decision for them. 149 Second,
states retain huge obstacles to overcome in proving voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing waivers of Fourth Amendment rights. 150
Finally, the consent rationale leads to unanswered questions about the
coercive means that could be used to obtain consent and the effect of
consent on the rights of third parties. 151
2. Samson as a Special Needs Case
Federal precedent requires use of the special needs test. 152 As such,
consequences of its relinquishment.
DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 62. It is possible for a criminal defendant to waive a constitutional
protection, provided that waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. Respondent’s Brief on the
Merits at 34, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (explaining that a defendant “may
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections afforded by the
Constitution”). An “individual’s consent to search may be deemed voluntary, for Fourth
Amendment purposes, even if it is motivated by the subject’s belief that refusal to consent will
result in concrete disadvantages.” Id. See also Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (holding
that an individual can give valid and binding consent to a search that will be performed at
unspecified times in the future). However, courts are required “to indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver” of Fourth Amendment rights. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 63. In
Fourth Amendment cases, courts often apply a less strict standard of waiver, as the Fourth
Amendment does not provide trial rights, but instead protects the right of persons to be left alone.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (finding a “vast difference between those
rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment”). In
Schneckloth, the Court addressed the question of what the prosecution must show to prove that
consent was given voluntarily. Id. The court determined that voluntariness is a “question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the circumstances, and that the state of a defendant’s
knowledge is only one factor to be taken into account in assessing the voluntariness of a consent.”
Id. at 223.
148. Reyes, 968 P.2d at 448; see also supra note 144.
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 146 and 147 and accompanying text.
151. For example, are there any limits on things to which someone may consent? See, e.g.,
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (holding that a search cannot be justified based on
consent when the consent was given because an officer claimed to have a warrant). Can the consent
rationale extend to forcing automobile search conditions on one who wishes to obtain a driver’s
license? How will third parties’ privacy rights be protected during consent searches? See infra note
169 (discussing Samson’s impact on third parties). If police may hold prison over a person’s head
to urge them to consent to a search condition, what else would be a permissible form of coercion?
For example, would it be permissible to coerce certain groups into taking medications, such as those
for sex offenders which reduce testosterone levels?
152. Support for use of the special needs test to determine if a warrantless search is permissible
comes from Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); see also supra note 30. “Although the most recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Samson strongly suggests that the balancing test, which is an easier test
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the special needs exception does not apply to suspicionless searches of
parolees because the searches are conducted for law enforcement
purposes, 153 they are conducted by police officers, 154 and parolees
already have a lowered expectation of privacy by virtue of their status. 155
Once it is determined that the state has a special need, that need
must be balanced against the parolee’s Fourth Amendment interests to
determine if the search is reasonable. 156 In Samson, the Supreme Court
struggled to conduct a balancing analysis, remarking that California has
grave safety concerns and parolees have no Fourth Amendment rights

for the State to satisfy, should apply to a Fourth Amendment analysis,” New Jersey courts have
decided to assess future searches “within the framework of the special-needs test.” State v.
O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 158 (N.J. 2007) (emphasis added). “The more stringent special needs
analysis provides an appropriate framework for evaluating defendant’s New Jersey state
constitutional claims.” Id. One may infer from the fact that the Supreme Court declined to use the
special needs test that the Court recognized that special needs is a “tough sell” in this case.
Castiglione, supra note 135, at 79-81 (“The fact that the majority eschews the special needs analysis
indicates that the majority knew that a compelling ‘special needs’ case possibly could not, in fact,
have been made.”).
153. The special needs exception applied only to states’ needs that go beyond a general interest
in law enforcement. RINGEL, supra note 29.
154. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (holding a warrantless search by a
probation officer permissible pursuant to a special need). Probation officers are more concerned
with rehabilitating, overseeing, and helping offenders to successfully reintegrate into society, not
with law enforcement. 67A C.J.S. Pardon & Parole § 62 (2007). Yet, many states use police
officers to conduct checks on parolees instead of probation officers merely because those states “do
not have the resources to assign the enforcement of a particular scheme to a specialized agency.”
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 28, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Some argue
that “so long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact
that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created
by the scheme itself.” Id. Others find the reintegration goal permanently at odds with the law
enforcement goal, such that police officers can never conduct the same type of supervisory searches
as parole or probation officers. See 67A C.J.S. Pardon & Parole § 62 (2007).
155. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The need of the state to search
parolees is not conceptually different from a general interest in law enforcement and crime control.
But see Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 5, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (claiming
that the Supreme Court’s past cases have “validated the supervision of probationers and parolees as
a ‘special need’ that can justify a suspicionless search” so long as the primary purpose of the search
“is not to detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing for use in a criminal prosecution”). “A state’s
operation of a probation system ‘presents special needs beyond normal law enforcement that may
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements’” in order to give officers
“the tools they need to adequately supervise parolees.” Id. at 22.
156. “Even if ‘special needs’ analysis did apply, the Court’s ‘special needs’ cases have
‘employed a balancing test that weighed the intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy against
the ‘special needs’ that supported the program.’” Brief for the Petitioner at 39 n.18, Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). “The benefit to the State of allowing police to conduct
suspicionless parolee searches does not outweigh the substantial intrusion on privacy.” Id. See,
e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (balancing the state’s interest in
controlling the flow of illegal aliens against a motorist’s right to free uninterrupted passage).
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and, thus, the balance falls in favor of the state. 157 The outcome of the
balancing test is not this clear-cut. Parolees retain a somewhat
diminished expectation of privacy, but that cannot be inferred to mean
they have lost all Fourth Amendment rights. 158
It is doubtful that the Court would have been able to justify
suspicionless searches of parolees based on special needs. 159 Should the
Court have affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in Samson
based on special needs, the Court would have ventured into
unprecedented territory by coupling California’s need to combat grave
safety concerns with the proposition that the searches are conducted for
a reason other than a general interest in crime control. 160 While this
157. See supra Part III.C.1 and accompanying notes (detailing the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Samson) and infra Part IV.A.2 (outlining the proper balancing test the Court should have
applied).
158. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d
1336 (10th Cir. 1996) (balancing the interests of sex offenders against the state’s interest).
A state statute requiring inmates convicted of offense[s] involving sexual assault to
provide the state with DNA samples before their release on parole does not violate the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; while
obtaining and analyzing the DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex offense is [a]
search and seizure implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search and
seizure in light of the inmate's diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion of saliva
and blood tests, and the legitimate government interest in the investigation and
prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a manner not
significantly different from the use of fingerprints.
59 AM. JUR. 2D Pardon and Parole § 126 (2007).
159. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 88 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
None of our special needs precedents has sanctioned the routine inclusion of law
enforcement, both in the design of the policy and in using arrests, either threatened or
real, to implement the system designed for the special needs objectives. The special
needs cases we have decided do not sustain the active use of law enforcement, including
arrest and prosecutions, as an integral part of a program which seeks to achieve
legitimate, civil objectives. The traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements are
waived in our previous cases on the explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the
search is not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.
Id. Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Samson, other courts’ decisions have presumptively
analyzed the Court’s refusal to use the special needs test in favor of the balancing test, finding that
the Court may have boxed themselves into a situation requiring expansion of the reasonableness
requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The Court’s
application, in Samson, of the totality of the circumstances analysis also may reflect its recognition
that the search in that case could not qualify as a ‘special needs’ search. . . . [T]he search in Samson
– that of a suspected parole violator’s person by a law enforcement officer . . . is difficult to
characterize as anything other than an ordinary law enforcement search for weapons or
contraband.”).
160. See supra Part III.C.1 (providing the majority’s expression of California’s interest in
conducting suspicionless searches of parolees to combat California’s grave safety concerns in a way
that works best for California); see supra Part II.B.3 (explaining that the special needs exception
requires the state to have an interest separate from the general interest in combating crime). Before
the Samson decision, United States v. Knights provided the controlling precedent that parolee
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proposition may seem plausible on its face, it is undercut by the
California legislature’s choice not to revoke parole for a charge of
possession. 161 A special needs analysis results in several possible
ramifications and shaky precedent for future courts to follow. 162
C. Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Decision
The Samson Court disregards potential problems arising from its
decision. First, the Court assumes that California’s prohibition on
arbitrary, capricious, and harassing searches is a valid check on police
In reality, no California court has ever
officers’ discretion. 163
searches require reasonable suspicion. See supra Part II.C.2 (detailing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Knights).
161. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 859 n.1 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). If California
has a special need requiring suspicionless searches to ensure that parolees do not recommit crimes,
this need would be served by revoking the parole of those who are found in violation. As the
California Legislature determined, it is counterproductive for California’s penal system to
reincarcerate former prisoners for possession. Id.; see also supra note 130. California’s need to
combat “safety concerns” appears, in practice, to be an interest in crime control, and therefore, not a
special need. While California should have the right to deal with crime control however it chooses,
California has already chosen to deal with parolee drug possession without revoking parole. The
constitutionality of California’s scheme should be judged based on the safeguards as they currently
exist, not pursuant to an unbounded panorama of options which may or may not be plausible. But
see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 678 n.2 (2002) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (criticizing the
Supreme Court’s choice to mandate procedures to the state that effectively “forc[e] the State to
employ one ‘functional equivalent’ rather than the other”).
162. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a hospital
policy requiring pregnant women to submit to drug testing was not valid because its primary
purpose was law enforcement). Special needs could be extended using the Samson Court’s
reasoning to cover several situations in which the Court has previously held that the interests were
not separate from general interests in crime control. Samson creates confusing precedent for courts
to follow as some courts favor limiting Samson to parolee searches while other courts favor
extending the principles of Samson to many different types of searches. Compare United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that “nothing in Samson suggests that a general
balancing test should replace special needs as the primary mode of analysis of suspicionless
searches outside the context of the highly diminished expectation of privacy presented in Samson”
when holding that the reasoning of Samson does not necessarily apply to probationers), and New
Jersey v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 277 (N.J. 2007) (“Although the most recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Samson strongly suggests that the balancing test, which is an easier test
for the State to satisfy, should apply to a Fourth Amendment analysis, we continue to adhere to our
statement . . . that future drug and alcohol testing programs will be assessed ‘within the framework
of the special-needs test.’ The more stringent special needs analysis provides an appropriate
framework for evaluating defendant’s New Jersey state constitutional claims.”) with United States
v. Lopez, 474 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If under the California parole-search statute, a
parolee has no expectation of privacy in his person, we reason that a parolee has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in his residence either, at least when the parolee is present.”).
163. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “Nothing about Petitioner’s conduct
gave rise to any suspicion that he was engaged in wrongdoing.” Brief for the Petitioner at 5,
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Rohleder testified “that he searches parolees on a
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invalidated a search because it was arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. 164
In effect, this safeguard does not provide adequate protection for
parolees. 165
‘regular basis,’ but ‘I don’t go after everybody all the time.’” Id. Rohleder further elaborated that
he needs to make sure parolees are obeying the law because it is a privilege for them to be out of
prison. Id. Requiring police officers to “articulate reasons for the search is a deterrent to impulsive
or arbitrary governmental conduct,” which is the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Reindl, supra
note 6, at 163.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment mandates
particularized suspicion as a limit on police powers, pointing to the special-needs
doctrine as an example of an accepted justification for suspicionless searches. Yet the
Court declined to use special needs as its underlying rationale. Rather, the Court
emphasized throughout its opinion that the determination of the search’s reasonableness
came from balancing Samson’s privacy expectations against state interests. The Court
observed the California’s backstop to seemingly broad and nonindividualized discretion
is the state’s “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” standard. The Court did not consider
whether the Samson search itself had been arbitrary, capricious, or harassing, and did not
suggest other guidelines that the state might employ.
Leading Cases, supra note 97, at 186.
164. Leading Cases, supra note 97, at 188. The prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, and
harassing searches is quite difficult to break – the standard is impossible to violate as long as the
searching officer is aware that he is searching a parolee. Id. at 189. The standard is also hard to
implement because it requires courts and judges to determine whether an officer has personal
animosity toward a person. Id. “Fourth Amendment inquiries typically do not examine the
subjective motivations of police officers but instead examine the objective reasonableness of the
officers’ actions.” Id. “California’s standard, in short, requires courts to assess the constitutionality
of parolee searches using an analytical tool disfavored by the courts themselves.” Id. at 190. See,
e.g., Transcript of Oral Arguments at 45, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (documenting
that upon questioning the state on whether a parolee getting stopped on every street corner by a
different cop would violate the standard, the state remarked, however unlikely this would be to
happen, if it did, it would not constitute an arbitrary, capricious, or harassing search). Thus
“California’s policy could facilitate unintentional harassment of parolees.” Leading Cases, supra
note 97, at 191. There is an inherent contradiction in allowing law enforcement officials the
discretion to conduct suspicionless searches while at the same time prohibiting offenders from
questioning the subjective motivations of the searching officer. Reindl, supra note 6, at 165-66.
See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005) (hypothesizing that even searching
a probationer’s home every five minutes might not be unreasonable). When comparing frequent
searches to the alternative of prison, prison is more invasive on an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Reindl, supra note 6, at 161. Therefore, any punishment that is less restrictive than prison
could be deemed reasonable. Id. But consider whether a short prison sentence or a lengthy period
of probation is more prohibitive of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 162.
165. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (“[B]road
statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review.”). California’s scheme of granting
unbridled discretion to police officers to search at will “resembles the general warrants and writs of
assistance that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment.” Brief for the Petitioner at 18, Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Even though the prohibitions do not adequately protect parolees,
they raise serious concerns about “the status of parolees, the appropriate level of state surveillance,
and the right way to implement similar schemes elsewhere.” Leading Cases, supra note 97, at 184.
The Court has divided the population into segments, chosen one segment, deprived members of that
segment of their Fourth Amendment rights, and justified their decision based on the fact that they
only chose one segment. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 911 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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(“But merely circumscribing the category of cases eligible for the death penalty cannot remove from
constitutional scrutiny the procedure by which those actually sentenced to death are selected.”). “As
a matter of policy the Court should have more narrowly tailored the guidelines for state law
enforcement to provide more direction to the states and to minimize Fourth Amendment violations
that may result from this kind of search.” Id. This is especially true considering the Court has
previously held grants of unfettered discretion unconstitutional. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1
(1990). “Although seemingly nothing more than an afterthought, this observation allowed the Court
to sidestep the larger issues of parolee status and privacy rights by handing over essentially all
oversight responsibilities for suspicionless parolee searches to the state.” Leading Cases, supra note
97, at 187. “Close examination of California’s standard reveals definitional, constitutional, and
practical shortcomings that make it an ineffective restraint on the search powers California grants to
its police officers.” Id. at 187-88.
Legal definitions of the “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” standard in California’s
courts are broad and somewhat circular. Courts describe “arbitrary” behavior as having
no legitimate purpose, sometimes pairing “arbitrary” with “oppressive”, courts refer to
“harassing” conduct as that “undertaken for purposes of harassment” including
“unrestricted searching . . . at the whim and caprice” of police officers. The term
“capricious” doesn’t generally merit its own definition in these cases; when it does show
up, it usually appears as part of the definitions of “arbitrary” and “harassing”.
Id. at 188. Violations of the arbitrary, capricious, or harassing standard are determined by assessing
three things: first, whether the officer had a permissible law enforcement purpose for the search;
second, whether the police officer conducted the search in a manner that was reasonable; finally,
whether the officer was motivated to conduct the search for reasons other than personal animosity.
Id. If the state satisfies these three criteria, the court will typically defer to the judgment of the
officer in the field on whether the search was reasonable. Id. An officer who “decides on a whim to
stop the next red car he or she sees” without a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or one who
searches the same parolee too frequently, at unreasonable hours of the day or night, or for an
unreasonable duration, violates the standard prohibiting arbitrary, capricious, and harassing
searches. Id. But, the “legitimate law enforcement purpose need not be specific or individualized.”
Id. at 189. The Samson Court chose not to enact other safeguards that the Supreme Court has relied
upon in the past, indeed, the Supreme Court did not even express concern that the prohibition on
arbitrary, capricious, and harassing searches may not be enough. See, e.g., United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court cannot know what
the practical consequences of an action will be until the procedure has been in effect and “tested in
the real world of state and federal law enforcement”). Blackmun continues:
[T]his Court will attend to the results. If it should emerge from experience that, contrary
to our expectations, . . . [the action] results in a material change in police compliance
with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here.
The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct demands
no less.
Id. See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 837 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]ith the
command of due process before us, this Court and the other courts of the state and federal systems
will perform the ‘duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care,’ an obligation ‘never
more exacting than it is in a capital case.’”). It seems as though it might be impossible for a parolee
to bring a successful claim based on a violation of the arbitrary, capricious, or harassing standard
given that the only actual criteria for determining the reasonableness of a search is whether the
officer has knowledge that the individual is a parolee. Castiglione, supra note 135, at 77. To this
end, “Courts must conduct an ‘objective assessment’ of the ‘facts and circumstances’ known to the
searching officer at the time the search is conducted” to determine if “factors that will ‘warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that one is on parole. James M. Binnall, Released From
Prison . . . But Placed In Solitary Confinement: A Parolee Reveals the Practical Ramifications of
Samson v. California, 34 NEW ENGLAND J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 65, 69-70 (2008).
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Further, the Court fails to analyze potentially outrageous
consequences for parolees and third parties if parolee searches are left
unconstrained. 166 First, a system of suspicionless searches is a
disservice to parolees because these types of searches foster resentment
of the justice system in parolees. 167 Parolees are also at considerable
risk of suffering from overly intrusive searches for no reason. 168 Also,
166. See Leading Cases, supra note 97, at 183. Other states will most likely follow California
in permitting suspicionless searches of parolees. As such, the Court should have more seriously
considered the ramification of its decision and taken its role in creating reasonableness standards for
lower courts to rely on more seriously. Id. at 191. “The Samson Court’s failure to provide
additional guidance for suspicionless searches of parolees strongly suggests that the Court does not
hold in high regard the status and privacy rights of parolees.” Id. at 192. But see United States v.
Freeman, 479 F.3d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that Samson only applies “when authorized
under state law,” so that a search could not be justified under special needs because it was
conducted by police officers when state law only allowed searches to be conducted by Special
Enforcement Officers); Rollins v. Florida, 948 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2007) (finding that as no statute in
Florida permitted suspicionless searches, the Samson ruling did not apply).
167. Brief for the Petitioner at 8-9, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Overall, the
standards formulated by the Court in Samson create bad policy for helping to assimilate released
prisoners into normal society. Leading Cases, supra note 97, at 192.
Suspicionless searches are likely to undermine the State’s interest in reintegrating
parolees into society. Subjecting parolees to unrestricted searches that may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment, in the absence of even minimal suspicion of
wrongdoing, is not likely to promote reintegration of the parolee into society at large.
Brief for the Petitioner at 8-9, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Another potential
detrimental effect of subjecting parolees to suspicionless searches is the impact these searches will
have on their psyche. Reindl, supra note 6, at 163-65. A person who is constantly distrusted by law
enforcement officials, even when engaging in everyday activity, may be more likely to respond by
becoming distrustful. Id. One parolee explains the resentment and isolation of the Samson rule:
For these reasons, when they first released me, I did not interact with those I did not
know. I shut out many who could have helped me navigate in a world I was not a part of
for over four years. For fear of being embarrassed, labeled, or harassed, I did not share
my story with anyone and many avoided me. Unfortunately, I am the representative of a
culture that already views trust as a weakness and engages readjustment demons in a
solitary battle. Therefore, in addition to the practical separation that an incident with law
enforcement fosters by physically driving many away from parolees, we must also deal
with the harbored intrinsic distrust amplified by the Samson decision that is often more
damaging. . . . I struggled with the concept of ‘normal’ for months after my release.
Inside, I had a place in the hierarchy of a vicious criminal element. In the free world, I
was an ex-convict initially trying to use the tools I employed in prison to construct a life
on the outside. I was unsuccessful. I could not communicate with those who could help
me because all meaningful dialogue triggered a sense of paranoia that haunted my early
days on the street.
Binnall, supra note 165, at 74, 76.
168. Brief for the Petitioner at 19-20, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). For
example, intrusive searches “such as strip searches and body cavity searches, are reasonable so long
as performed on a parolee, whether or not the particular parolee being searched is likely to be
concealing drugs or other contraband on her body.” Id. Both probation and parole were designed as
less restrictive placements than prison. Reindl, supra note 6, at 165.
Given the fact that most people satisfy their probationary supervision without incident,
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third parties can be harmed by random searches of parolees. 169 This
third party concern was validated in People v. Woods 170 when officers
searched a probationers home in order to gain evidence about a third
party also living in the house. 171 In Woods, the California Supreme
Court allowed admission of the evidence despite the purpose of the
search. 172 Finally, suspicionless searches of parolees defeat the Court’s
interest in judicial efficiency, 173 create new concerns for sentencing, 174
and present unlimited questions about the future of parolee searches. 175

and fully re-enter society afterwards, it is worth considering whether requiring all
probationers to subject themselves to otherwise unreasonable, warrantless searches of
their persons, homes, and automobiles is actually promoting lawful behavior or
antagonizing the very individuals we are supposed to rehabilitate.
Id. This logic applied to the parolee as well.
169. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (explaining that
suspicionless searches of parolees will affect “third parties who share a home with parolees, [which]
may prevent parolees from finding suitable housing and forming close relationships”). “If increased
numbers of probationers were not welcome in homes with supportive environments, higher
recidivism rates and a corresponding decrease in public safety may be expected, both of which
would detract from the optimum successful functioning of the probation system.” Brief for the
Petitioner at 24, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). The state contends that the Fourth
Amendment “simply was not intended to address the social concerns petitioner wishes to raise.”
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 16, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). There are also
concerns for those who travel with parolees. Filler, supra note 4. A parolee who is searched and
discovered to possess some form of contraband may give the police reasonable suspicion to search
all persons riding in the same car or walking with the parolee. Id.; see supra note 58 (noting that
Samson’s walking companion, who was not on parole, was searched as a result of the parole stop).
“This snowball process could take on troubling racial skew, since 64% of all state inmates are
minorities. To the degree that minority offenders socialize predominately with other minorities . . .
it will be minorities most at risk due to proximity to parolees.” Filler, supra note 4. But see
Commonwealth v. Scott, 916 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that persons with a
probationer cannot be searched merely because they are associated with the probationer, as this does
not equate to reasonable suspicion). At least three different categories of persons could be harmed
by the Court’s decision in Samson: those who ride in cars with parolees, those who live with
parolees, and those who associate with parolees in public. See, e.g., Binnall, supra note 165, at 7174.
170. 981 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 1999).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Reindl, supra note 6, at 167. “If what is desired by a new probation search and seizure
rule is judicial efficiency, eliminating the precedential value of an immense collection of criminal
case law, which courts have been refining for decades, is hardly an efficient use of legal resources.”
Id.
174. See Filler, supra note 4. After Samson, prosecutors have new incentives to seek parole
over probation. Id. For example, for an offender with nine months time served, the prosecutor will
be more likely to ask for an indeterminate sentence of nine months to five years than time served
plus five years of probation. Id. Conversely, the increased supervision of parolees may make those
deciding whom to parole more apt to place inmates back on the street earlier in their sentences. Id.
175. Id. Take for instance, the very real possibility of electronic monitoring of parolees. Id.
The government could attain remarkable levels of supervision in a system where “any parolee can
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The decision in Samson has already been extended farther than
justified by the Supreme Court’s reasoning. In United States v. Lopez,
the Court of Appeals found that since Samson held that a parolee has no
expectation of privacy in his person, it is only logical that officers may
also conduct suspicionless searches of the parolee’s residence. 176 This is
particularly alarming because of the enormous level of protection the
home has traditionally been given in Fourth Amendment cases. 177
While the Samson decision may appear limited in scope, the
implications raise serious concerns about Fourth Amendment
protections.
V. CONCLUSION
The Samson Court strayed from precedent in order to reach a ruling
that effectively strips parolees of the little protection they had under the
Fourth Amendment. 178 It is imperative that constitutional rights are
maintained to protect all citizens, even in the face of momentary
emergencies. 179 The Court’s chosen method to arrive at its decision was
improper – the Framers never intended warrantless searches to be
reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 180 Further, the Court
should have taken a more serious look at the ramifications of its decision
for parolees and for ordinary citizens before making such an
unprecedented decision. 181
Rachael A. Lynch
be located, and searched, at anytime.” Id. The decrease in crime from such a system could be
thought to justify the infringement on Fourth Amendment rights. Id. In the future, the Court is
likely to face diverse issues related to the Fourth Amendment, including the advancement of
suspicionless searches for those using public transportation, new and more advanced internet
surveillance techniques, and new and advanced uses for public surveillance cameras. Castiglione,
supra note 135, at 112-13.
176. United States v. Lopez, 474 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2007). The Lopez Court concluded
that the parolee’s residence was not significantly different from the parolee’s person given the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Samson. Id.
177. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (finding that the Fourth Amendment
“draws a firm line at the entrance to the house”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)
(finding that searches of a home without a warrant are per se unreasonable as a “basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law”).
178. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable suspicion
standard developed in Knights that applied to parolees prior to the Court’s decision in Samson).
179. See supra note 30.
180. See supra Part II.A, and accompanying notes (explaining the lack of warrantless searches
during the time the Constitution was written and subsequent modern trend of creating exceptions to
the warrant requirement).
181. See supra Part IV.C, and accompanying notes (detailing several possible ramifications of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson).
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